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PROBLEMS IN CLASSIFICATION OF PARTICULAR
PROPERTY UNDER COMMUNITY PROPERTY REGIMES
For centuries the community property regime has been
based on a two-fold classification: the property of the community and the separate property of the spouses. The basic concepts were conceived in an age when, unlike today, most of the
wealth was represented in immovables. To the system's credit,
it has worked admirably in our modern society. Yet, the advent
of new types of property, undreamed of centuries ago, along
with the operation of a community property system in a federal
union under a supreme constitution, has brought additional
pressures to bear and required some adjustments. The areas in
which adjustments to the general scheme of property classification have been found necessary are few, but only the more important ones will be investigated in this Comment. Areas selected for consideration are: transactions involving United
States savings bonds; stocks and dividends, with emphasis on
stock dividends; homestead associations; pensions; commingling
of community and separate property; and separate and joint
bank accounts. These subjects are essentially unrelated, save
by the common difficulty in application of the general rules of
classification.
UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS

The United States savings bond is available to natural persons in three capacities: sole owners, co-owners, and beneficiaries.' The federal government's power to issue savings bonds
rests upon the constitutional power to borrow money and the
"necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution, and it is
exercised through congressional acts 2 and Treasury Regulations

promulgated pursuant to congressional grants of authority.8
Treasury Regulations provide that no judicial determination
will be recognized which impairs the rights of survivorship
given to a co-owner or beneficiary. 4 When a savings bond is
registered in the name of co-owners, and one co-owner dies
before the bond is presented, "the survivor will be recognized
1. 31 C.F.R. § 315.7 (1957). This regulation provides that only two persons
may use the co-ownership or beneficiary forms. In the former case the registration must be in the form "X or Y," and in the latter case in the form "X payable on death to Y," or "X P.O.D. Y;"

2. 49 Stat. 21, § 22 (1917), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 757c (1959).
3. 31 C.F.R. §§ 315.0-315.94 (1957).
4. Id. § 315.20(a).
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as the sole and absolute owner" as if the bond were registered
in his name alone. 5 Beneficiary bonds, though payable to the
owner during his lifetime, become the sole and absolute prop6
erty of the beneficiary at the owner's death.
7
These Treasury Regulations have the force of federal law.
Given conflicting state property schemes, particularly those of
the community property states, much litigation has considered
rights relative to savings bonds under federal and state law.
In resolving conflicts between state laws governing transmis-

sion of property at death and the survivorship provisions of
the Treasury Regulations, most state courts concluded that the
Regulations prevailed over the state law and governed both the

ownership and distribution of the proceeds 8of the bonds, though
they disagreed on the underlying rationale.

The Louisiana court originally leaned towards the majority
rule, giving unconditional effect to the Treasury scheme of

survivorship despite conflicting state law,9 but in the first case

dealing directly with a conflict between the Treasury Regulations and the community property system, the Louisiana court
made a break with the majority position. 10 A husband had used
5. Id. § 315.61.
6. Id. § 315.66.
7. See, e.g., Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) ; Winsberg v. Winsberg,
220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730 (1952).
8. Among the various theories used to explain the so-called "majority rule"
were:
(a) Contract embodying federal law, e.g., Chambliss v. Black, 250 Ala. 604,
35 So. 2d 348 (1948) ; Knight v. Wingate, 205 Ga. 133, 52 S.E.2d 604 (1949) ;
Lemon v. Foulston, 169 Kan. 372, 219 P.2d 388 (1950) ; Walterberger v. Pearson,
81 Ohio App. 51, 77 N.E.2d 491 (1946) ; In re Horstman's Estate, 398 Pa. 506,
159 A.2d 514 (1960).
(b) Supremacy of federal law, e.g., United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust
Co., 50 F. Supp. 73 (M.D. Pa. 1943) ; Lee v. Anderson, 70 Ariz. 208, 218 P.2d
732 (1950) ; In re Stanley, 102 Colo. 422, 80 P.2d 332 (1938).
(c) Common law joint tenancy, e.g., Autry's Estate v. Commissioner, 221
F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1955) ; Barnett v. Barnett, 91 F. Supp. 680 (N.D. Ohio
1950); Stephens v. First Nat'l Bank, 65 Nev. 352, 196 P.2d 756 (1948).
(d) Survivor takes ownership as third party beneficiary, e.g., Murry's Estate,
236 Iowa 807, 20 N.W.2d 49 (1945).
9. Succession of Tanner, 24 So. 2d 642 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946). Tanner
held that when husband and wife purchased co-ownership bonds, and then one
died, there was no inheritance tax due by the survivor, and it was proper to
omit the bonds from the estate of the deceased. However, a subsequent case,
Succession of Raborn, 210 La. 1033, 29 So. 2d 53 (1946), pointed out Tanner
had failed to consider the wording of the Treasury Regulations, which specifically made the bonds subject to state inheritance taxes.
10. Succession of Geagan, 212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118 (1948). See Comment,
7 KAN. L. REV. 512 (1959), where the author severely criticizes the Louisiana
position after Geagan, perhaps without full appreciation of the social interest
of Louisiana in the preservation of the community property system.
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community funds to purchase beneficiary bonds in favor of a

stranger to the community. The court paid homage to the federal regulation by awarding the beneficiary full ownership of
the bonds, but held that the surviving wife (who had not participated in the purchase) was entitled to a sum equal to one-

half the value of the bonds at the husband's death. The court
reasoned that a contrary holding would allow a husband, as
manager of the community, to dispose mortis causa of his wife's
interest in community property by a contract with the federal

government. 1 In later cases similar reasoning was fortified by
the rationalization that the federal government was not concerned with inheritance of property within a state and that such
was beyond its constitutional power. 12
11. The facts of Geagan left little doubt that the husband was attempting to
place as many of the community assets as possible beyond the reach of the wife.
The evidence showed the husband had much animosity toward his wife: he had
openly declared his intention to defeat her rights and had systematically disposed
of community assets. The court said: "[T]he dispositions of community property by decedent were large in proportion to the total value of the community
property. . . . We do not mean to imply that a disposition of such proportion
would, of itself, in every case, be fraudulent or injurious to the wife, or that
there is any specific proportionate amount of movable community property which
the husband cannot donate by particular title, but the disposal of such a large
proportion of the community becomes important when considered with all the
other facts and circumstances surrounding this particular case." 212 La. at 595,
33 So. 2d at 125.
The Geagan court was also concerned that allowing the husband to so contract with the federal government would be in effect allowing him to dispose
mortis causa of the wife's half of the community. Id. at 597, 33 So. 2d at 126.
This, of course, would prejudice the wife's right to make a testamentary disposition of her interest in the community. See Slater v. Culpepper, 222 La. 962,
64 So.2d 234 (1953).
12. Succession of Gladney, 223 La. 949, 954-58, 67 So. 2d 547, 549-50 (1953)
"There is no need of the federal government in its contractual regulations with
its bondholders to encroach on the law of Louisiana, when a reasonable construction can be given to both federal regulations and our State laws. . . . We
have on several occasions held that the bonds will be paid in accordance with the
stated contract, beneficiary or co-owner, but that the payee or beneficiary is a
debtor of the former owner or his heir. . . . Here in seeking authority for a
construction of a federal regulation or a reasonable implication therefrom, loose
construction could come to mean the right of the federal government to do in its
regulations whatever was not forbidden by the U.S. Constitution, provided the
act was deemed to be for the general good. If such a theory of constitutional
construction were to prevail and the original notion of the Constitution as a
grant of power, under which everything not granted was withheld-were to be
replaced by the rule that everything not withheld was granted, the federal government would be admittedly supreme and the reserved rights of the States
would speedily become only a formula of words."
Winsberg v. Winsberg, 220 La. 398, 406-07, 56 So. 2d 730, 732 (1952) : "[T]he
defendant cannot be accorded greater rights, merely because the donation is in
the form of a federal contract, than he would have had if it had been by last
will and testament as prescribed by our law. And, while Louisiana may not
require that the bonds be paid to anyone other than the named beneficiary, it
undoubtedly has the power, which was reserved to it by the Tenth Amendment . . . to decree that the beneficiary or payee is indebted to the estate of the
former owner, or his heir, in an amount equal to the value of the gift."
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The Louisiana rule was limited neither to attempts of a husband to deprive his wife of her share in the community property, nor to the use of bencficiary bonds. If the spouses used
community funds to purchase co-ownership savings bonds in the
form of "husband or wife," the surviving spouse was recognized as owner of the bonds; but he was debtor of the estate of
the deceased spouse for half the value of the bonds. 13 As this
14
debt could be enforced even by legatees of the deceased spouse, '
a fortiori forced heirs were likewise protected. The Louisiana
court did concede that the Treasury Regulations provided an
additional method of disposition mortis causa, free of the formal
requirements of the Louisiana Civil Code.', Clearly, the Louisiana court assumed that the Treasury Regulations were designed merely to provide a simple method of payment for the
federal government," so that it would not be subjected to inconvenience and delays attendant to the settlement of conflicting or disputed claims.' 6 The very wording of the regulations
7
lent authority to this proposition.1
Texas law developed similarly: first it adhered to the ma19
jority position,'3 then abandoned it,
thus setting the stage for
13. Slater v. Culpepper, 222 La. 962, 64 So. 2d 234 (1953).

Slater con-

cluded that registration of bonds in co-ownership form did not show an intent
to make a disposition mortis causa, although it was conceded that use of beneficiary bonds would show such intent. See Winsberg v. Winsberg, 220 La. 398,
56 So. 2d 730 (1952) ; Succession of Geagan, 212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118 (1948).
Succession of Land, 212 La. 103, 31 So. 2d 609 (1947) was a case similar on
its facts to Slater. A widow had purchased co-ownership bonds, payable to herself or her daughter, and the widow died first, leaving her daughter as her
universal legatee. The court held the daughter entitled to the entire amount of
bonds, free from any judgment in favor of the deceased's succession. Slater
distinguished Land on the ground the daughter took the bonds under the deceased's will rather than by their survivorship provisions, a distinction which
may be less than sound. It should be noted that in Land the court reserved the
right of another forced heir to claim his full legitime, and to claim collation
because of the gift. See text accompanying notes 41-44 infra. Query: since the
court recognized the daughter took the bonds as a donation mortis causa, would
not the forced heir's only remedy be reduction instead of collation?
14. Cf. Succession of Land, 212 La. 103, 31 So. 2d 609 (1947).
15. Winsberg v. Winsberg, 220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730 (1952).
16. Slater v. Culpepper, 222 La. 962, 970, 64 So. 2d 234, 237 (1953).
17. See 31 C.F.R. § 315.61 (1957) : "[T]he survivor will be recognized as
the sole and absolute owner" (Emphasis added) ; 31 C.F.R. § 315.66 (1957):
"[Tihe beneficiary will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner" (Emphasis
added.).
The argument was made that there was a distinction between the
language of the regulations, and language indicating that the survivor will "be"
the sole owner. Note, 37 TUL. L. REv. 115, 116 (1962).
Free v. Bland, 369
U.S. 663, 668 (1962) disposed of this argument on the ground the distinction
was insubstantial in light of the intent of the regulations to create a right of
survivorship.
18. E.g., Ricks v. Smith, 159 Tex. 280, 318 S.W.2d 439 (1958).
19. Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961) decided that stock
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the important decision in Free v. Bland.2° A husband had used
community funds to purchase co-ownership bonds in the names
of both spouses. The wife died, leaving the bonds uncashed, and
vesting the bulk of her estate in a son by a prior marriage. The
son claimed either half the bonds themselves or half their value.
The Texas court rendered a judgment vesting ownership of the
bonds in the husband in accordance with the Treasury Regulations, but ordered the husband to pay the deceased wife's heir
half the value of the bonds. The United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the state law must yield under the supremacy clause to the Treasury Regulations. The regulations were
interpreted to provide not only a convenient method of payment,
but to determine ownership of the proceeds of the bond as well
as the bond itself. The Court reasoned that the sale of savings
bonds was inextricably bound up with management of the national debt, the success of its management depending "to a significant measure upon the success of the sales of the savings
bonds."' 2 1 Congress' commission to the Treasury to make the

bonds attractive to investors was thus interpreted as an authori22
zation to issue bonds which would avoid probate proceedings.
Hence by compelling reimbursement to the estate of the deceased
co-owner of his share of community funds used to make the purchase the state interfered with the federal scheme, and in fact
nullified the state's ostensible compliance with the regulation
by awarding ownership to the surviving co-owner.
Though Free is couched in broad language and is susceptible
registered in names of husband and wife with right of survivorship did not become survivor's property.
The trial court had rendered judgment in favor
20. 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
of the husband for the title to the bonds, but ruled that in equity the son was
entitled to half the value of bonds, and fixed a lien on the bonds to secure pay-

ment. The intermediate appellate court, 337 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960),
awarded full title to the husband without any obliagtion of reimbursement, relying

on Ricks v. Smith, 159 Tex. 280, 318 S.W.2d 439 (1958).

The Texas Supreme

Court then overruled Ricks in Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565
(1959) and in Bland v. Free, 162 Tex. 72, 344 S.W.2d 435 (1961) the judgment of the trial court was reinstated. The final disposition of the case is found

at 163 Tex. 594, 359 S.W.2d 297 (1962).
21. 369 U.S. 663, 669 (1962).
22. 49 Stat. 21, § 22 (1917), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 757c (1959).
The Court's indication that the bonds could be used to avoid complicated
probate proceedings may give rise to the argument that the bonds would likewise
be a method of avoiding succession debts. This was laid to rest in Yiatchos v.
Yiatchos, 84 Sup. Ct. 742, 746-47 (1964), where the Court said: "It would not

contravene federal law as expressed in the applicable regulations to require the
bonds to bear the same share of the debts that they would have borne if they had

been passed to petitioner as a specific legacy under the will rather than by the
survivorship provision of the .bonds."
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of an equally broad interpretation that most transactions with
savings bonds are outside the purview of state law, 23 it does contain limiting language. A possible limitation is suggested by
language employed in stating its holding: the Court mentioned
that state laws which prohibited a married couple from taking
advantage of survivorship provisions must fall. Does this mean
the advantage can be exercised only inter se, or does it mean one
spouse can use community funds to purchase savings bonds and
name one not his spouse as co-owner or beneficiary, and avoid
reimbursement to the other spouse? Free, limited to its facts,
does not answer this question. A second limitation, equally important, was expressed in the following caveat, which hereafter
will be referred to as the fraud exception to Free:
["T]here is an exception implicit in the savings bond regulations, including the survivorship provisions, so that federal
bonds will not be a 'sanctuary for a wrongdoer's gains.'...
The regulations are not intended to be a shield for fraud,
and relief would be available in a case where the circumstances manifest fraud or a breach of trust tantamount
thereto on the part of a husband while acting in his capacity
as manager of the general community property. However,
the doctrine of fraud applicable under federal law in such a
case must be determined on another day, for this issue is not
presently here.' '24 (Emphasis added.)
It is unclear whether the Court means that the existence of
fraud applicable under federal law" would be determined under
state law. However, support of the quoted language by citation
of a leading case 25 which created an exception to the Erie doctrine, seems to indicate the Court was thinking in terms of
creating a federal standard of fraud, apart from concepts of
fraud under state law.
Perhaps the scope of Free was delineated in the later and
troublesome opinion in Yiatchos v. Yiatchos,2 a case arising
under the community property law of the state of Washington.
A husband used community funds to purchase beneficiary savings bonds, payable upon his death to his brother, thus creating
23. Note, 37 TUL. L. REV. 116, 118 (1962). See also text accompanying
note 29 infra.
24. 369 U.S. 663, 670 (1943).
25. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
26. 84 Sup. Ct. 742 (1964).
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the fact situation not posed in Free. The state court felt the
mere use of community funds to benefit one not a member of
the community brought the case within the fraud exception of
Free, and imposed a trust upon the bonds for the benefit of the
deceased husband's estate and his widow.2 7 The United States
Supreme Court chose as the proper implication of Free
that fraud would be judged by federal standards, but added significantly that in applying the federal standard it would be
"guided by state law insofar as the property interests of the
widow created by state law are concerned. '28 (Emphasis added.)
On its face, this language may represent a retreat from the
broad language of Free, which arguably had indicated a supremacy of federal law regardless of the importance of the state
law to a coherent local property system. 23 Any other conclusion
appears negated by the words of the Court:
"It would seem obvious that the bonds may not be used as
a device to deprive the widow of property rights which she
enjoys under Washington law and which would not be transferable by her husband but for the survivorship provisions
30
of the federal bonds.
Even following these two leading decisions, surprisingly little can be said with certainty concerning the relation of savings
bonds to community property. It is clear that both Free and
Yiatchos require states to recognize savings bonds as simple
methods of transferring property at death 3 1 without regard to
formalities required by state law for valid testaments. This requirement is not a severe blow to state property schemes; Lou27. In re Yiatchos' Estate, 60 Wash.2d 179, 373 P.2d 125 (1962).
28. 84 Sup. Ct. 742, 745 (1964).
29. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962): "The relative importance to
the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid
federal law."
30. 84 Sup. Ct. 742, 745 (1064). Compare Howard v. United States, 125
F.2d 986, 994 (5th Cir. 1942): "State rules of property must be applied and
enforced in proceedings under the revenue statutes in the absence of a conflicting
federal law, treaty, or constitutional provision on the subject ....
[5]ince the
ultimate tax question here depends upon the ownership of the funds on deposit,
and since the law of Louisiana is controlling, the disputable presumptions above
mentioned are so bound together with local property rights that the failure to
apply them would result in serious interference with local substantive law."
31. 84 Sup. Ct. 742, 746 (1964) : "[T]he holding of the court below, which
requires that the bonds be disposed of by will or by state intestacy provisions,
is nothing more than a state prohibition against utilizing savings bonds to transmit property at death and is . . . forbidden by Free v. Bland." See Winsberg v.
Winsberg, 220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730 (1952); Succession of Raborn, 210 La.
1033, 29 So. 2d 53 (1946).
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isiana had made such a recognition even prior to Free.3 2 Thus if
the amount of the bonds is less than the purchaser's interest in
the community, the surviving beneficiary or co-owner is entitled to all the bonds without any reimbursement obligation, at
least where state law does not prevent the disposition for reasons other than form. Yiatchos places one restriction on the use
of bonds as a "will-substitute": if under state law a spouse has
a vested one-half interest in each item of community property,
both during the marriage and after its dissolution, all the bonds
could not pass by the survivorship provisions; instead only the
3
half which had belonged to the purchaser-spouse would do soA
At least under these limited circumstances, Yiatchos seems to
allow a judgment for half the bonds themselves, 34 a remedy not
even recognized by most state courts prior to Free.
Also established is the proposition that if the state property
law allows one spouse to consent to a conversion of community
property into separate property either by agreement to become
effective upon death of one spouse, or by gift during lifetime,
and such consent is given, all the bonds pass to the surviving
beneficiary or co-owner, again without any reimbursement obligation.
Though not explicit in the jurisprudence the Treasury does
at least have a valid interest in rapid and easy identification of
'32. Winsberg v. Winsberg, 220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730 (1952).
33. The nature of the wife's interest in community property during the
marriage is discussed in Comment, 25 LA. L. REv. 159 (1964). The dissenting
Justices in Yiatchos criticized the suggestion that the wife could have a vested
half interest in each individual item of the community during the existence of the

marriage. 84 Sup. Ct. 742, 747 (1964). It seems fairly clear in Louisiana that
the wife, after dissolution of the marriage, does have a vested half interest in
each item of the property of the former community. See, e.g., Tomme v. Tomme,
174 La. 123, 139 So. 901 (1932); Succession of Heckert, 160 So. 2d 375 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1964). Query: could states, either by judicial decision or legislative act, take the position that the wife does have a vested half interest in each
item of the community property during the marriage, thus if the husband invested an amount equal to half the community property in beneficiary (or perhaps co-ownership) bonds, he would have succeeded in willing only one-quarter
of the total community property to the beneficiary, when his intent was to will
his entire half interest? The remaining part of the purchaser's interest would
then pass under his will, if any, and if not, in intestacy.
:4. 84 Sup. Ct. 742, 745-46 (1964) : "According to the court below, the
widow had a 'vested one-half interest' in the bonds, which may mean that under
Washington law the wife before and after death has a half interest in each item
of the community estate, including the particular bonds involved in this case,
and cannot be forced to take cash or something else of equal value upon a division of the community property between herself and those entitled to take her
husband's half. Under such circumstances, since we cannot say that this property
right, if it exists, is insubstantial, to allow all of the bonds to pass to the designated beneficiary would effect an involuntary and impermissible conversion of
the widow's assets."
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the payee of savings bonds. In fact, this was well settled in
8 5 Thus,
Louisiana prior to the confusion introduced by Free.
whenever an adjustment is required to protect the interest of an
adverse claimant to savings bonds, it is submitted that the proper
method is to vest the named beneficiary or co-owner with ownership of the bonds, and render a money judgment in favor of
the adverse claimant for the amount necessary, even though it
be equal to the value of the bonds, thus making the named
payee a mere conduit.3 6 Exceptionally, if the adverse claimant
had, during the existence of the community, a vested interest in
each bond, as opposed to an interest which could be satisfied
by the proper amount of any property from the common fund,
courts may be authorized to order the payee of the bonds be
changed 7 Of course, whether reimbursement would ever be
proper depends on the present force of Free and its relation to
Yiatchos - inquiries which, at best, verge on speculation.
There seem at least two resolutions of the Free and Yiatchos
decisions. By the first the cases consider different and unrelated problems. Free determines primarily rights acquired by
transmission of property at death and only collaterally affects
community property - the result would have been exactly the
same if the facts had arisen in a state not utilizing the community property system, since Treasury Regulations having the
force of federal law determine such rights. One writer has even
advanced the suggestion that Free could be considered an open
invitation to defeat the rights of heirs, particularly forced
heirs.38 Yiatchos, on the other hand, clearly stands as a direct
exposition of the relation between savings bonds and community
property, as the Court here considered whether the husband, as
head and master of the community, can utilize federal savings
bonds to dispose mortis causa of property owned not by him
but by his wife. The facts of the decisions graphically illustrate
the distinction: in Free the adverse claimant unsuccessfully asserted rights allegedly acquired by transmission on death of a
co-owner, rights directly in conflict with Treasury Regulations
governing savings bonds; in Yiatchos, at least under one interpretation of the facts, the surviving wife successfully asserted
35. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
36. This was the solution adopted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Winsberg v. Winsberg, 220 La. 398, 56 So.2d 730 (1952). See note 49 infra,
and accompanying text.
37. See note 34 8upra.
38. See Note, 37 TuL. L. REv. 116, 118 (1962).
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that her present ownership in the bonds could not be divested
by the death of her husband3 9 In one case the claimant had,
prior to the purchaser's death, only an expectancy; in the other,
the claimant had ownership. It is certainly arguable that the
latter rights are entitled to greater protection than the former,
and indeed the latter rights may be protected under the due process provisions of the United States Constitution. This analysis
would allow Free to be fully effective within its ambit of inheritance rights, and Yiatchos equally effective in the realm of the
wife's ownership rights acquired under community property
systems. Thus savings bonds may be freely used to transmit
property at death, but they may not be used to deprive a member of a marital regime of ownership. Since fraud was never
alleged in Free, and under this analysis Yiatchos would likely
not be used to interpret directly the extent of the Free rule, it
would yet be uncertain just what conduct would constitute fraud
under the exception. Is it inconceivable that even the conduct in
Free relative to inheritance rights would be fraud? If Yiatchos
could be used to illuminate the newly-created federal standard
of fraud, it is at least arguable that any conduct which deprives
one of property rights under state law would be "fraud." 4
Truly, Free would be emasculated. The important point, however, is that recognition of a distinction between the two decisions would not compel adoption of the latter argument, leaving the fraud test to be delineated by later decisions.
It may be questioned whether the above analysis would be
appropriate in relation to the peculiar Louisiana institution of
41
forced heirship, which has received constitutional protection,
and is certainly more fully protected than ordinary rights of
heirship. Louisiana has held, despite Free, that under state law
savings bonds must be considered in calculating the mass of the
succession under article 150542 and thus in determining the
amount of the forced portion. One subsequent decision 48 indi39. The problem of the wife's interest in the community property during the
marriage is a complex one. See note 33 supra. See, e.g., Bender v. Pfaff, 282

U.S. 127 (1930).
40. See discussion at notes 46-49 infra.
41. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16: "No law shall be passed abolishing forced
heirship .. "
42. Succession of Mulqueeny, 156 So. 2d 317 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 157 So. 2d 234 ("no error of law").
43. Succession of Weis, 162 So. 2d 791 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964): "We are
not concerned with the question of disposable portion nor with a legitime or the
doctrine of collation. U.S. Savings Bonds are governed strictly by the federal
law and not by the state law. . . . It is to what extent these bonds figure in
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cated in dictum that collation of savings bonds registered in
the name of one heir could be required. The Yiatchos rationale
appears to support these decisions, but their continued application depends wholly upon a recognition by the United States
Supreme Court that the interest of the forced heir is as important as that of a spouse. 44 Even affirming these two Louisiana
decisions would not answer the more difficult problem whether
reduction could be applied to a disposition by savings bonds,
should it be otherwise impossible to fulfill an heir's legitime.
The first possibility, though attractive, is greatly weakened
by the fact that the Court, in Yiatchos, completely ignores the
suggested distinction between the two cases, and in fact, the
Court characterizes the later case as one delineating the scope
of the fraud exception to Free.45 Thus the second possibility,
already mentioned, is suggested by the language of the court:
that the fraud exception of Free has come to mean that utilization of savings bonds to deprive one of a property interest
recognized under state law is "fraud. ' 46 The interest of a spouse
in the community property has been recognized by the United
States Supreme Court as ownership. 47 The clear implication
seems to be that each spouse's moiety in the community would
be preserved inviolate under this theory. Following this theory
to its ultimate result leads to the conclusion that, since it is
based on the state property law's valuation of the interest to be
protected, the interest of the forced heir would receive protection
almost equal to that of the spouse in the community. This suggested interpretation of the "fraud" standard appears most
clearly when considered in relation to the facts of Winsberg v.
Winsberg.48 There a man purchased beneficiary savings bonds
payable to his brother; subsequently the purchaser married.
After his death the widow gave birth to a posthumous child.
Certainly the conduct of the father would not constitute fraud
calculating the inheritance tax or a legitime or an interference with the rights of
a child born subsequently to the naming of a payee on death that the state law
governs." Compare Succession of Gladney, 223 La. 949, 67 So. 2d 547 (1953).

44. See generally McKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY §§ 57, 62 (2d ed. 1925).
45. 84 Sup. Ct. 742, 744 (1964).
46. See Comment, 11 LOYOLA L. REV. 311, 319 (1963), wherein the author,
writing prior to Yiatchos, suggests it may be fraud whenever one member of a
community buys savings bonds which will go to a third party without the
knowledge or consent of the other spouse; further, that since there is no independent federal law of inheritance or community property, state law should
determine the consequences.

47. Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930).
48. 220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730 (1952).

1964]

COMMENTS

in the usual meaning of the term, yet it is submitted that Yiatchos could logically mean the father would be depriving the posthumous child of a property right recognized under state law,
49
and the child would be entitled to appropriate protection.
Whichever theory is adopted, one further point may weigh
against much sympathy for the forced heir in relation to savings
bonds. It is well settled that the forced heir may realistically
be deprived of his legitime through the use of life insurance
policies. 0 It may not be contrary to Louisiana policy, therefore,
to recognize an additional method to accomplish the same end.
Even so, under what seems to be the better analysis of Yiatchos
-that
any use of savings bonds to deprive one of a property
interest recognized under state law is "fraud" within the meaning of Free-such
a determination would be for the courts of
Louisiana, and not for federal courts.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND HOMESTEAD ASSOCIATIONS

The importance of building and loan associations in Louisiana has been repeatedly affirmed.5 1 Here it is proposed to investigate the relevant law, inasmuch as it touches the community property system. Unique law has developed in two particulars: ownership of stock purchased in the name of the wife,
49. One difficulty with the suggestion in the text is that under Louisiana
law a testament falls by the posterior birth of a legitimate child. LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 1705 (1870). Certainly, this would also include a posthumous child. Winsberg v. Winsberg, 220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730 (1952). Would it follow that the
disposition by savings bonds, a federal contract, would likewise be invalid? It is
submitted that the policy behind identification of the payee, for the benefit of
the federal government, would dictate the sound result to be that the named
beneficiary or surviving co-owner of the bonds would be entitled to the proceeds,
so that the federal government could discharge its obligation by payment to him.
Then, the rights under state law, as provided by article 1705, could be protected
by rendering a judgment against the payee in the full amount of the bonds.
This was the solution adopted by the Winsberg court prior to the decision in
Free. Following Yiatchos it is submited Winsberg may still have validity.
Winsberg pointed out, and it is suggested this may be proper following the
Yiatchos interpretation of Free, that the supremacy of Treasury Regulations
only made it unnecessary to follow the formal requirements under state law for
a valid testament, but still left applicable the other state rules applicable to dispositions mortis causa. Id. at 404, 56 So. 2d at 731.
50. The leading case establishing this proposition is Sizeler v. Sizeler, 170
La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930).
51. E.g., Mayre v. Pierson, 171 La. 1077, 1084, 133 So. 163, 165 (1931)
"The purpose for which building and loan associations are established is to enable
persons of small means and limited incomes to acquire homes and thus become
better citizens and more identified with the welfare and growth of the community." See Legislative Symposium: The 1958 Regular Session - Civil Codeand Related Subjects: Part II, 19 LA. L. REV. 65, 68 (1958): "The building
and loan associations have made possible the high percentage of individual home
ownership in Louisiana ..
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and the sale-and-resale device customarily used to secure the
loan transaction.
Ownership of Stock in Building and Loan Associations
Purchasedin Name of the Wife
A.

Statutory Basis
The first building and loan statute was enacted in 1888,52
and in 1894 reference to acquisition of stock by married women
was added.5 The 1894 enactment gave married women somewhat broader authority than was customary prior to the married womens' emancipation act, 54 but it remained for Act 120

of 1902r5 to inject new concepts into the relatively static field
of community property. Section 13 of that act allowed married
women to "subscribe for, hold, withdraw, transfer, pledge, borrow upon and surrender stock . . .without the . . .authoriza-

tion of their husbands." Significant as an indication of the intent of the legislature, the same section provided that these activities were "for her separate benefit as paraphernal property."
Despite frequent amendment to other portions of the building and loan law, the portions relevant to community property
remained unchanged until the passage of section 34 of Act 140
of 1932. The significant portions of the 1902 act were retained,
but it was added that during the marriage or after its dissolution, the shares held in the name of a married woman "shall not
form part of the marital community or of the estate of the husband for any purpose." 56 This section gave any person who
might have a claim adverse to the wife's interest in building and
loan shares standing in her name a ninety-day period from the
57
effective date of the act in which to challenge her ownership.
In the absence of suit within the stated period, the interest of
52. La. Acts 1888, No. 115. Prior to this time there was no statutory law
on the subject, but such associations were in existence, and later they were held
to have been valid organizations. American Homestead Co. v. Linigan, 46 La.
Ann. 1118, 15 So. 369 (1893) ; Succession of Latchford, 42 La. Ann. 529, 7 So.
628 (1890) ; see Plough, Commentary, Homestead, Building and Loan Associalions in Louisiana, in 2 WEST'S LA. STAT. ANN. 289, 290 (1951).
53. La. Acts 1894, No. 74.
54. LA. R.S. 9:101-105 (1950).
55. La. Acts 1902, No. 120, § 13.
56. The opinion has been advanced that the purpose of this legislation was to
encourage small investments in homestead associations. See Daggett, Policy
Questions on Marital Property Law in Louisiana, 14 LA. L. R.v. 528, 541
(1954).
57. The statute termed this a period of "prescription and repose" and pro-
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the wife became incontestable.58 The statute was again amended
in 1938 to delete both the peremption period and the incontestable interest of the wife, thus almost reviving its 1902 wording: "Any married woman may subscribe for, own, hold, withdraw, transfer, give, pledge, borrow upon and surrender shares
in such associations as a femme sole." 5 9 However, the significant clause which provided that such activities should be "for
her separate benefit as paraphernal property" was omitted.
This change was probably intended to subject the shares of
building and loan associations to the applicable rules of community property. 60 In effect it greatly reduced the intrusion of the
building and loan law into the field of community property law.
In 1958 the 1938 act, now appearing as R.S. 6:750, was amended to allow the married woman to receive the fruits from shares
61
held in a building and loan association.
A similar statute enacted in 1940 governs the ownership of
shares in federal savings and loan associations. The act almost
tracks the provisions of the 1938 act governing state building
and loan associations, but added the significant provision that
the shares shall be the wife's paraphernal property only if purchased with separate funds of the wife.6 Shortly thereafter,
the latter provision was dropped 8 to make the act correspond
exactly with the statute governing state associations. This uniformity was preserved when the 1958 amendment relative to
the fruits of the stock was likewise made applicable to federal
64
savings and loan associations.
B.

Jurisprudence
The statutory development has more than academic interest,

vided that it was to run and operate against all persons, to include minors,
interdicts, married women, and the State of Louisiana. La. Acts 1932, No. 140,
§ 34. Cf. La. Acts 1932, No. 140, § 76, which gave a like period of "prescription
and repose' within which any interested party was required to challenge the constitutionality of any provision of the act. This latter section was declared unconstitutional in Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936).
58. See Ferguson v. Hayes' Heirs, 202 La. 810, 13 So. 2d 233 (1943) (§ 34
held constitutional against attack that it was broader than title); see also
Cameron v. Rowland, 215 La. 177, 40 So. 2d 1 (1949); Carter v. Third Dist.
Homestead Ass'n, 195 La. 555, 197 So. 230 (1940).
59. La. Acts 1938, No. 337, § 5.
60. See The Louisiana Legislation of 1938-Miscellaneous Matters, I LA.
L. REv. 120, 125 (1938).
61. La. Acts 1958, No. 365, § 1.
62. La. Acts 1940, No. 95, § 2.
63. La. Acts 1942, No. 122, § 1.
64. La. Acts 1958, No. 365, § 2. This statute now appears as LA. R.S. 6:832
(1950).
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since generally the ownership of building and loan stock standing in the name of the wife will be determined by the statutory
provisions in force at the time the stock is acquired.0 Carter v.
Third Dist. Homestead Ass'n" was the first case interpreting
the building and loan law in relation to ownership of stock.
Before 1932 the wife had purchased stock in her name, and her
husband took possession of the shares, alleging she had used
community funds to pay the price. The wife sued in effect for
restitution of her paraphernal property.67 The husband argued
that the 1902 act was unconstitutional
and that the 1932 act
could not be applied to purchases before its passage. The court
implied that the 1902 act was unconstitutional but that any infirmity was cured by the peremption period allowed the husband after the passage of the 1932 act to challenge acquisitions
of stock in the name of the wife. 69 Since the husband had not
filed suit for that purpose he was barred from asserting a claim
to the stock's ownership adverse to the wife. 7 0 More important,
65. Cameron v. Rowland, 215 La. 177, 40 So. 2d 1 (1949) ; Carter v. Third
Dist. Homestead Ass'n, 195 La. 555, 197 So. 230 (1940). Note, however, that in
Carter the court found later enactments could cure possible constitutional infirmities in earlier statutes by the device of a period of prescription within
which any interested party is required to file suit to challenge rights acquired
under the earlier statute.
66. 195 La. 555, 197 So. 230 (1940).
67. Procedurally the suit was a mandamus proceeding against the homestead
association to compel issuance of duplicate shares, and the husband was cited as
a defendant. The court pointed out the legal effect of the suit was a suit against
the husband to compel the restitution of paraphernal property. Carter v. Third
Dist. Homestead Ass'n, 195 La. 555, 197 So. 230, 232 (1940). It is clearly
recognized in the Civil Code that a wife may sue the husband for the restitution
of her paraphernal property without seeking a dissolution of the marriage.
LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2387, 2391 (1870).
This is independent of the action of
the wife to sue for the separation of property during the existence of the marriage. Id. art. 2325.
68. The ground of unconstitutionality urged was that the title of the act
did not state as its purpose a change of the community property system. Carter
v. Third Dist. Homestead Ass'n, 195 La. 555, 562, 197 So. 230, 232 (1940).
69. Accord, Ferguson v. Hayes' Heirs, 202 La. 810, 13 So. 2d 233 (1943).
Here the wife had likewise purchased shares prior to 1932, and no suit had been
instituted within the ninety-day period to have the shares declared community
property. Consequently, it was held the shares belonged to the separate and
paraphernal estate of the wife, and her collateral heirs were entitled to have
them distributed among themselves. La. Acts 1932, No. 140, § 34, was held
constitutional, both against attack that it was broader than its title and contained two objects, and that it created a special law in favor of married women
who have subscribed for and own stock in building and loan associations and
changed the law of descent and succession as regards a special class of property.
70. Carter v. Third Dist. Homestead Ass'n, 195 La. 555, 564, 197 So. 230,
233 (1940): "Under the general law of this state . . . a man has no right to
assert judicially against his wife a claim that is based upon only his interest
in the matrimonial community as long as the community remains undissolved,
unless it be in a suit which seeks or which may accomplish a dissolution of the
community. In the present case it is admitted that the matrimonial community
has not been dissolved. Hence the only right of action that the husband has
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the court gave the 1932 statute the effect which the wife contended the 1902 act had- ownership of the stock in the wife
when the shares were placed in her name, regardless of the
source of the purchase money. The husband was barred from
showing that community funds were used on the ground that
the marriage was still in existence, but the court left open the
question whether the husband would be able to assert a claim
for his share of the community funds which went to pay for
the stock.
Cameron v. Rowland 71 presented facts which encompassed
most of the legislation in this field. Here a wife began purchasing shares in a state building and loan association in 1914 and
continued periodic purchases until her husband's death in 1941.
In 1930 she had purchased a bloc of investment shares in the
same institution, and in 1935, the association was converted into
a federal corporation. All the shares were in the wife's name,
and all purchases were made with community funds. A forced
heir of the deceased husband contended that the stock belonged
to the community. On rehearing, 72 the court confirmed the
Carter implication that the ownership of the stock was governed
by the legislation in force at the date of acquisition. 73 The investment shares purchased in 1930 were thus the separate property of the wife; all the other shares purchased prior to 1938
fell under either the 1902 act or the 1932 act; in either case they
also became the separate property of the wife. The 1938 act
was construed as showing intent that shares be governed by
had to assert judicially any community interest that he might have claimed in
the building and loan stock that was bought in his wife's name was the right of
action which was accorded him by section 34 of the act of 1932; and that right
of action expired ninety days after the act went into effect. . . . [S]ection 34 of
the act of 1932 . . . remained in effect for a period far exceeding ninety days,
which was long enough for the statute of limitation and repose to have its

effect."
71. 215 La. 177, 40 So. 2d 1 (1949).
72. Cameron v. Rowland, 215 La. 177, 203, 40 So. 2d 1, 15 (1949). In the
original opinion the court had ruled that the right of the forced heir to challenge
the placing of the funds in building and loan stock in the name of the wife had
come into existence only at the death of her father; that the applicable act in

effect at the death was La. Acts 1940, No. 95; that although most of the stock
had been acquired when the institution was state-chartered the wife had accepted

the re-issue of shares in the federal institution, and had thus become bound by
the laws relating thereto; that, therefore, all the stock must be classified as community property.

73. Id. at 222, 40 So. 2d at 18. The court found that whatever the interest of
the widow prior to the conversion of the institution into a federal corporation
and the exchange of her stock, this interest was not thereby altered. It was characterized as only a transformation of her interest from one association to the
other. See Kittredge v. Grau, 158 La. 154, 103 So. 723 (1925) ; cf. Dillon v.
Freville, 129 La. 1005, 57 So. 316 (1912).
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general community property law, and thus the shares purchased
between the date of this act and the 1940 act, which specifically
governed federal corporations, were treated as community property. Since the 1940 act required the purchase to be made with
paraphernal funds to classify shares as separate property of the
wife, those shares purchased from the date of that act until the
7 4
husband's death were community property.
Cameron's application of the peremption period against the
forced heir may be questioned, since the presumptive heir could
not bring suit within the ninety-day period to protect inheritance rights, unless his ancestor should die within that period.
The court, however, avoided grave constitutional problems7 5
and protected the forced heir by answering the question of restitution left open in Carter, ruling that the legislation was designed to protect building and loan associations in their transactions with married women and not to divest the community
of the funds used in the purchase of stock which became the
property of the wife merely because of the special statute then
in force.7 6 Thus the adverse claimant is entitled to an accounting adjustment at the dissolution of the community. Though
constitutional objections may thus be avoided, the plight of the
adverse claimant is not wholly settled by the Cameron rule, since
apparently no consideration would be allowed for increases in
the value of the stock or interest for the use of the funds.7 7
The incongruity of the Cameron restitution rule is indicated
74. Implicit in this reasoning is a holding that the ownership of shares in
federal savings and loan associations

was

governed by the law applicable

to

state-chartered associations until such time as the state passed special laws to
govern ownership of stock held by its citizens in federal corporations. It is at
least arguable that neither could the state make its general law applicable to
govern ownership in federally chartered corporations nor pass special laws to
govern such. See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). Compare Bank of America v. Parnell, 352
U.S. 29 (1956).
75. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16.
76. See Plough, Commentary, Homestead, Building and Loan Associations in
Louisiana, in 2 WEST's LA. STAT. ANN. 289, 321 (1951), where the author seems
critical of Cameron for ordering an accounting of the wife's indebtedness to the
community for the purchase price of all stock decreed to be her separate property on the ground that all the stock acquired under the tenure of Act 140 of
1932 should be free from all adverse claims, even as to restitution of funds used
for the purchase. This criticism may be questioned, for as interpreted by Cameron
the act was only intended to reach the bare question of ownership. Compelling
restitution is an entirely different question, and Cameron would appear in line
with decisions in other areas of community property on this holding. See text
accompanying notes 224-246 infra.
77. See Slater v. Culpepper, 233 La. 1071, 99 So. 2d 348 (1957) ; Succession
of Geagan, 212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118 (1948).
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by a later case78 where shares were purchased at a time when
the applicable statute caused ownership to vest in the wife. She
sold the stock for a lesser sum, which was then turned over to
the community. The court properly ruled that she was indebted
to the community for the deficit, but left little doubt that had
the shares sold for more than the purchase price, the wife could
have retained the profits as her paraphernal property. If the
legislation was in fact merely designed to protect the building
and loan associations in their transactions with married women,
there seems little justification for allowing a wife to speculate
with community funds and retain all profits from the speculation.
Though not yet interpreted, the most recent amendments79
deserve investigation. They purport to allow a married woman
to receive the fruits from shares standing in her name in both
state and federal building and loan associations to the same extent as if she were single. It now seems the courts will look to
the general rules governing classification of property to determine whether shares in her name are separate or community
property.8 0 However, also under community property law,
fruits from either separately owned shares of the wife or community owned shares would normally fall into the community.8 '
If the shares were her paraphernal property, she could preserve the fruits as separate property only by filing certain declarations.8 2 In light of the Cameron rationale the amendments
may have been intended only to protect the associations, so they
could safely pay dividends to the person in whose name the
stock stands without subjecting themselves to possible adverse
claims. Thus the community would own the fruits. On the other
hand, the amendments could be interpreted as intending to
change the general rule, and make the wife owner of all the
fruits from stocks held in her name. This interpretation would
allow the possibility of channeling profits of admittedly community property, if community funds were used to buy building
and loan stock in the name of the wife, into the separate estate
of the wife. In this event the husband or his heirs would obtain
78. Slater v. Culpepper, 233 La. 1071, 99 So. 2d 348 (1957).
79. Compare La. Acts 1958, No. 365, § 1, with La. Acts 1958, No. 365, § 2.
The former now appears as LA. R.S. 6:750 (Supp. 1963) and the latter as LA.
R.S. 6:832 (Supp. 1963).
80. See notes 108-116 infra, and accompanying text.
81. See notes 108-116 infra, and accompanying text.
82. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2386 (1870), as amended.
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half the stock or half its value at the time of dissolution, but
presumably they would have no claim for the dividends earned
by their half of community stock until that date. An intermediate approach, and perhaps the soundest one, would be to decide that the amendments relieved the wife of the necessity of
filing the declarations to preserve dividends from separate
stock as separate property, but that in case of community stock
in her name she would have no authority to appropriate the
dividends for her estate.
Borrowing Money -

Current Status of Sale-and-Resale Device

statute 8

The first
governing building and loan associations
granted them power to acquire a vendor's privilege on immovable property as security for loans. This grant of power has
been continued through many amendments of the statute.

4

The

device first chosen for this purpose was the sale-and-resale:
the borrower sells the property to the association for a cash
amount equal to the loan requested, then the association resells
to the borrower on credit.8 5 But for special statutes 6 approving the procedure, Louisiana jurisprudence would classify this
transaction as a pignorative contract, a security transaction,
and would give it effect only as a mortgage.8 7 The lawmaker's
motive in granting the vendor's privilege to building and loan
associations is obvious: the legislature has found that these as83. La. Acts 1888, No. 115, § 4.
84. LA. R.S. 6:766 (1950) contains the present provision.
85. See Sarpy, Why the Building and Loan Sale and Resale in Louisiana?,
16 TUL. L. REv. 249, 251 (1942). See also Plough, Commentary, Homestead,
Building and Loan Associations in Louisiana, in 2 WEST's LA. STAT. ANN. 289,
292 (1951): "To no other type of corporation has the legislature ever granted
the very valuable privilege of a vendor's lien upon real estate taken as security
for loans. Ordinarily, where one person sells his property for cash to a second
person and the latter resells it to the former on terms of credit, the jurisprudence is definitely established in Louisiana that such second person has only the
security of an ordinary mortgage and does not acquire the rights and privileges
of a real vendor. But, as to these associations, Act No. 115, and all subsequent
statutes dealing with the organization and operation of such institutions, have
given and preserved to these institutions this valuable right and the law reports
are replete with cases recognizing this peculiar and distinctive advantage. Possessed exclusively by these institutions, that right has been jealously protected
and preserved by the Court, as it crashed head-on into other laws of the State,
particularly the laws of descent and distribution and those relating to the ownership of property."
86. Capillion v. Chambliss, 211 La. 1, 17, 29 So. 2d 171, 176 (1946) : "[A]
lien, unlike a mortgage, cannot be created by convention or contract between the
debtor and creditor unless there is a statute declaring that such a contract shall
create the lien."
87. See, e.g., Bagala v. Bagala, 237 La. 60, 110 So. 2d 526 (1959) ; Latiolais
v. Breaux, 154 La. 1006, 98 So. 620 (1924).
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sociations perform a useful social function, and their formation
and existence are to be encouraged.8 8 The ordinary mortgage
has a low rank in competition among Louisiana security devices;89 the vendor's privilege enjoys a much higher ranking 90

and increases the chances of loan repayment. Privileges are
creatures of legislative intent; and while the method chosen
may be open to question,91 there can be no longer any question
of the power of the legislature to so favor building and loan

associations.

92

Early cases9" established that the sale-and-resale transacLouisiana courts have also frowned on other uses of the sale-and-resale transaction. In Succession of Lewis, 157 So. 2d 321, 323 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963),
a husband had acquired separate property prior to his marriage, and in an effort
to make the property that of the community, he conveyed it to his attorney, who
reconveyed it back to the husband and wife. Forced heirs of the husband were
allowed to attack the transaction: "A spouse does not, by a sale valid on its face
and a resale, change the character of his property from separate to community.
. . . He certainly cannot do so by a simulated transaction in fraud of his heirs."
Accord, Betz v. Riviere, 211 La. 43, 29 So. 2d 465 (1947).
88. La. Acts 1888, No. 115, declared building and loan associations were corporations of "public utility and advantage." See Treigle v. Acme Homestead
Ass'n, 181 La. 941, 160 So. 637 (1935) ; State er rel. Cotonio v. Italo-American
Homestead Ass'n, 177 La. 766, 149 So. 449 (1933) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Louisiana Tax Comm'r, 175 La. 119, 143 So. 23 (1932).
89. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3186 (1870) : "Privilege is a right, which the nature
of a debt gives to a creditor, and which entitles him to be preferred before other
creditors, even those who have mortgages."
90. Id. arts. 3186, 3267.
91. See generally Sarpy, Why the Building and Loan Sale and Resale in Louisiana?, 16 TUL. L. REV. 249 (1942) ; Note, 31 TuL. L. REV. 671 (1957).
92. Mayre v. Pierson, 171 La. 1077, 1084-85, 133 So. 163, 165 (1931) : "Ordinarily, therefore, the transaction by which a building and loan association lends
money to one of its members and secures such loan by a charge on the property
of such member would be classed as a mortgage, except for the fact that our
Legislature has deemed it well, in pursuance of its policy to encourage the formation and operation of building and loan associations, to invest such a transaction
with the status of a sale so as to secure the amount due by the borrowing member by a vendor's lien and privilege on the property affected. Since liens and
privileges are created by law, it was within the power of the Legislature to do
this."
93. In Liquidators of Prudential Savings & Homestead Soc'y v. Langermann,
156 La. 76, 100 So. 55 (1924), the first wife of husband had died in 1907, and
in 1910 he had sold to and reacquired from a building and loan association certain property the first wife had bequeathed to him. While still owing the amount
borrowed, husband remarried in 1915. In 1919, he made a dation en paiement
of the property to the association. Son by first marriage then contended LA.
CIVIL CODE art. 1735 (1870) (now repealed) caused forfeiture of the ownership
of the husband. The court held the second marriage could not have the effect of
divesting the ownership of the building and loan association, which association
was standing in the position of the unpaid vendor. Thus the husband had only
a defeasible title. The dation en paiement was assimilated to a voluntary retrocession, in lieu of compulsory enforcement by suit of the resolutory condition
implied in the sale.
In Hutts v. Crowley Building & Loan Ass'n, 146 La. 85, 83 So. 417 (1919),
community property had been acquired during the existence of the marriage. In
1900 husband had sold the property to building and loan association, and wife
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tions were actual sales, in which title passed to the building and

loan association, and then back to the borrower, and which consequently imposed upon the building and loan association all
the incidents of a normal sale, such as the risk of loss 94 and the
warranty liability of an ordinary vendor.95 Recognition of title

transfer inevitably led to problems when the borrower was one
member of a conjugal union, and the property which served as

security for the loan had, prior to the sale and resale, belonged
to the separate estate of the borrower. It seemed logical to argue
that as the reacquisition was under a title different from the
former ownership, the latter title would have to fulfill all the
requirements relative to acquisitions under onerous title by one

spouse during the marriage in order to retain its former character.9 6
This problem was squarely raised in the leading case of
9 7
Mayre v. Pierson.
There the wife owned paraphernal property,
had died in 1902, prior to the reconveyance of the property. In 1903 the property was reconveyed. Over a claim by the wife's heir that the transactions should
be considered as one, which should have taken place at one time, the court held
that, as the husband had become a widower prior to the time of the reconveyance,
he became the owner of the whole of the property. This is a clear recognition
that the community held no title at the time of the death of the wife, the title
at that time resting in building and loan association.
See also Barnes v. Thompson, 154 La. 1036, 98 So. 657 (1923) ; Holloman v.
Alexandria & Pineville Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 137 La. 970, 69 So. 764 (1915)
(transaction not a mortgage, but a purchase and resale) ; American Homestead
Co. v. Karstendick, 111 La. 884, 35 So. 964 (1903) (transaction a valid sale;
provision held constitutional).
94. Caire v. Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, No. 7315, Orl. App. unrep. dec.,
discussed in Plough, Commentary, Homestead, Building and Loan Associations in
Louisiana, in 2 WEST's LA. STAT. ANN. 289, 302 (1951). Here the property
suffered hurricane damage while title stood in the name of the association. The
court said "the language of the statute regulating these associations" left "no
room for any other construction than that such transfer and re-transfer not only
have (had) the effect of a sale and a resale so as to operate a privilege equal in
rank to that of a vendor, but that such transfer and re-transfer are in fact and
in law a sale and resale for all purposes whatever."
95. Hausler v. Nuccio, 214 La. 1069, 39 So. 2d 734 (1949), noted 24 TuL.
L. REV. 235 (1949). La Acts 1950, No. 85, § 1, overruled the holding of Hausler.
96. It is possible for either spouse to acquire property as his separate property during the existence of the community. In the case of acquisitions in the
name of the husband, in order for him to prove later that it is his separate property, it is sacramental, Succession of Goll, 156 La. 910, 101 So. 263 (1924), that
he include in the deed of acquisition the dual declaration that the property is
acquired with his separate funds, and is for his separate estate. See, e.g., Slaton
v. King, 214 La. 89, 36 So. 2d 684 (1948). In the case of acquisitions in the
name of the wife, to avoid a presumption that the property is community, she
must prove: (1) that she possesses separate funds under her administration and
available for investment; (2) that the cash portion of the price bears such a relation to the whole as to make the property purchased sufficient security for the
credit portion; and (3) that her paraphernal property and revenues are such
as to enable her to make the purchase with reasonable expectation of meeting
the deferred payments. See Fortier v. Barry, 111 La. 776, 35 So. 900 (1904).
97. 171 La. 1077, 133 So. 163 (1931).
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and she entered the traditional sale-and-resale to secure a building and loan association advance for the payment of her separate debts. Thereafter judgments were recorded against her husband, and a subsequent purchaser of the land brought action to
compel erasure of the judicial mortgages which had allegedly

attached to the property on the theory that it became community property when reacquired during the marriage." The court
found that the wife had conveyed the property as her separate

and paraphernal property, and that it came back to her in the
same classification; thus the judicial mortgage was ineffective.

However, the apparent adherence of the Mayre court to the formal requirements for acquisition of property by the wife as her
separate property prevents the opinion from casting much doubt

on the sale theory. 99
An approach other than the sale theory was taken in the
later case of Succession of Farley,1°0 where the court classified

the transaction as a pignorative transaction, intended not pass
title but only to create security for the building and loan association. Later affirmation'' of this theory made it clear that a
wife could use her property as security without danger of chang-

ing its character.
Strangely, the problem of sale-and-resale of the husband's
98. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2402 (1870). Compare id. art. 2334, as amended to
codify the jurisprudential theory of reinvestment of separate funds.
99. In Robinson v. Allen, 88 So. 2d 64, 66 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1956), the
court said: "It is true that in Mayre v. Pierson the deeds executed by the wife
contained recitals that the property was sold, reacquired and mortgaged as the
separate and paraphernal property of the wife under her separate administration
and control, while the deeds before us in the instant case contain no such recital
as to the property remaining the paraphernal property of the wife or that it was
under her separate administration and control. But we do not believe that the
absence of such recitals in the deeds we are considering makes any difference
whatever, and our opinion is that notwithstanding that . . . [the wife] sold her
property to the homestead and then reacquired it for the purpose of borrowing
•. . with the property as security, this did not change the character of the property from paraphernal to community or common property."
100. 205 La. 972, 18 So. 2d 586 (1944). A son had conveyed his property to
an association, and it was resold to the son and his mother, the latter apparently
being added to give the association greater security. At the time of the resale
the husband of the mother was living, and at his death the heirs contended a
one-half interest in the property should be inventoried as community property.
The mother entered a formal disclaimer of intent to acquire any interest in the
property, and while the decision largely turned upon the disclaimer as offsetting
the presumption that property acquired in the wife's name during marriage belongs to the community, the court said: "The transaction ... was never intended
The sale and resale of the land constituted
to operate as a transfer of title ....
a pignorative contract, which was made in the form of a sale and resale for the
purpose merely of giving the building and loan association a vendor's lien, in addition to the special mortgage." Id. at 984-85, 18 So. 2d at 590.
101. Capillion v. Chambliss, 211 La. 1, 29 So. 2d 171 (1946).
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separate property was not presented until the courts had fully
developed the present theory in relation to the wife's separate
property. Following the earlier sale theory to its logical conclusion, the position of the husband seeking to preserve his property
as separate and yet have use of it as security would be somewhat
weaker than that of the wife because the normal rule in relation to acquisitions under onerous title by the husband requires
dual declarations in the deed that he is using his separate funds
and purchasing for his separate estate to preserve the separate
character of the acquisition. 10 2 However, in the first case 10 3 the
court decided that the dual declaration rule was not applicable,
on the theory that the husband had merely exchanged his property for a loan, thus invoking the only recognized exception to
the dual declaration requirement. 0 4 Shortly thereafter, 0 5 the
sale-and-resale of the husband's property was clearly characterized as a pignorative contract. As a result, the separate property of the husband and of the wife will be treated the same way
in sale-and-resale transactions with building and loan associations.
Though a judicial solution has been carefully worked out,
recent legislative action may eventually make the problem moot.
After many years of agitation, 1°0 the legislature in 1958 adopted
a statute0 7 which provides that a mortgage taken by a building and loan association shall rank as a vendor's privilege upon
immovable property, just as if the sale-and-resale had been entered into. It is expressly provided that this procedure is merely optional; but in view of the expense and additional trouble of
the sale-and-resale transaction, it is likely that usage of the older procedure will decline. However, even should the older procedure be completely supplanted, knowledge of the earlier jurisprudential solution will continue to be necessary for a long
period to come.
102. See note 96 supra; Lazaro v. Lazaro, 92 So. 2d 402
1957) (dictum).
103. Lazaro v. Lazaro, 92 So. 2d 402 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
104. See, e.g., Succession of Land, 212 La. 103, 31 So. 2d
105. Ruffino v. Hunt, 234 La. 91, 99 So. 2d 34 (1958).

(La. App. Or]. Cir.
1957).
609 (1947).
The court also took

the position that the husband simply did not "acquire" any property in the sense

that word is used in LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2402 (1870).
153 La. 384, 96 So. 1 (1922) (on rehearing).

CIf. Otis v. Texas Co.,

106. E.g., Sarpy, Why the Building and Loan Sale and Resale in Louisiana!,

16 TUL. L. REV. 249 (1942) ; Note, 31 TVL. L. REV. 671 (1957).
. 107. La. Acts 1958, No. 317, § 1, now appearing as LA. R.S. 6:796 (Supp.
1963).
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STOCK, CASH DIVIDENDS, AND STOCK DIVIDENDS

Generally, acquisitions of stock by members of a marital
community are governed by the general rules of property classification. 08 Thus, when stock is acquired during the community's existence, even in the name of one spouse, it is presumed
to be community property, 10 9 but either husband"0 or wife"'
may rebut this presumption and prove the stock is separate
property. Should evidence establish that a mixture of separate
and community funds was used to acquire it, the stock will be
community property. 12 Stock inherited by one spouse is separate property of that spouse' 13 and the same result follows from a
donation of stock to one spouse. 114 The restrictive rule that a
108. This proposition may have been questionable under some of the provisions
of the Louisiana version of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, LA. R.S. 12:521-543
(1950). However, a significant addition made by La. Acts 1954, No. 648, § 1,
appears to attest the validity of the proposition advanced in the text. This act
now appears as LA. R.S. 12:525 (Supp. 1963) : "[A] married woman may subscribe for, own, hold, transfer, give, pledge, borrow upon, and surrender shares
and certificates of stock in corporations organized under the laws of this state
or of any other state or of the United States as a femme sole, and further provided that, when a certificate of stock stands in the name of a married woman
the corporation transferring the stock upon her sole endorsement thereof is fully
protected in making said transfer of said endorsement.
"In all cases in which, at the time of the enactment of the present amendment, any husband, heir, creditor, or other person or party in interest claims or
pretends or believes or is in a position to assert that said husband or his heirs,
or any heirs, creditors, or any other party or parties in interest has or have any
interest or ownership or claim whatsoever, adverse to any transfer or pledge
heretofore made, without the authorization of her husband, by any married woman
of stock standing in her name, or adverse to the right of such married woman to
make hereafter, without the authorization of her husband, any transfer or pledge
of any stock now standing in her name, suit to have said ownership or interest
declared and recognized must be instituted by such party or parties within a
delay of ninety days from July 28, 1954, it not being the purpose hereof to affect
the ownership of any such certificate or certificates of stock as between the married woman and such other party but it being the purpose hereof to protect any
corporation that has made or may make such transfer on the sole endorsement
of such wife or any transferee or pledgee who has received or may receive said
stock certificate on the sole endorsement of such wife; and this period of prescription shall run and operate against all persons whomsoever, including married
women, minors and interdicts." (Emphasis added.)
The similarity of the introductory provisions of the above act to the acts
relative to acquisition of stock of building and loan associations by married women
is striking. See notes 52 through 64 supra, and accompanying text.
109. See Mackenroth v. Pelke, 171 La. 842, 132 So. 365 (1931) ; Rappenport
v. Patten, 13 So. 2d 497 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943) ; cf. Smith v. Gloyd, 182 La.
770, 162 So. 617 (1935) (exchange of stock for land; stock took place of cash).
110. Fleming v. Commissioner, 153 F. 2d 361 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Succession of
Hemenway, 228 La. 572, 83 So. 2d 337 (1955) ; Bruyninckx v. Woodward, 217
La. 736, 47 So. 2d 478 (1950).
111. Cf. Succession of Land, 212 La. 103, 31 So. 2d 609 (1947).
112. Succession of Hemenway, 228 La. 572, 83 So. 2d 377 (1955). See notes
196-206 infra, and accompanying text.
113. Succession of Hemenway, 228 La. 572, 83 So. 2d 377 (1955).
114. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870).
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husband, to prove that an acquisition is his separate property,
must declare in the act of acquisition that he is purchasing for
his separate estate and with his separate funds is apparently
relaxed in the case of stock purchases,'"' as it may also be in
the case of all movables. 110 Property holdings which are directly
traceable to separately owned stock will retain the character of
separate ownership. 117 Thus where a spouse owns a separate
partnership interest, which during marriage is converted into a
corporation, the stock which now represents his interest will
remain his separate property, 1 18 and where corporate reorgani115. Bruyninckx v. Woodward, 217 La. 736, 47 So. 2d 478 (1950) ; cf. Fleming v. Commissioner, 153 F. 2d 361 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Kittredge v. Grau, 158 La.
154, 103 So. 723 (1925).
116. See Bruyninckx v. Woodward, 217 La. 736, 746, 47 So. 2d 478, 481
(1950) : "The presumption in favor of the community provided by Article 2405
is rebuttable by the husband (as it is by the wife) in all cases, excepting his
purchases of real property during the marriage ....
Counsel for plaintiff do not
suggest that the exception should be extended to the husband's purchases of movables." Compare Huie, Separate Ownership of Specific Property Versus Restitution from Community Property in Louisiana, 26 TUL. L. REV. 327, 460 (1952) :
"(1) earmarking of movables by a recital in the deed is necessary when there is
a deed . . .;

(2)

. . . it will not be required that a deed be executed in order to

put recitals in it; and (3) in the absence of a deed there is a rebuttable presumption that the husband's investments of his separate funds in movables are
for the benefit of the community . . ." with Daggett, Policy Questions of Marital
Property Law in Louisiana, 14 LA. L. REV. 528, 53940 (1954) : "In the case of
the husband, it is well settled that in order to retain the separate character in a
purchase of realty with separate funds he must give a double recitation in the
deed to the effect that he is buying with his separate funds for his separate
benefit. It is suggested that in purchasing stocks, bonds, or other movables that
this recitation might be solemnly made before a notary and proper witnesses concurrently with the purchase of movables and a copy of the instrument attached
to the evidence of title of the movables. It is possible that this device might be
effective in a settlement between the spouses or their heirs at the termination of
the community." See also Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34
TUL. L. REv. 3, 16-17 (1959).
117. See Fleming v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1946), where separate ownership of stock by the husband was established by tracing to separate
property owned over 30 years prior to suit.
118. Kittredge v. Grau, 158 La. 154, 103 So. 723 (1925). Succession of
Hollier, 158 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), writs granted, 160 So. 2d 231,
takes a different approach. There a husband had owned a separate partnership
interest, which partnership was several times dissolved by death of other partners during the husband's marriage. The court held the interest was now comimunity property, largely because there was no showing that at the time of the
formation of each new partnership that only the assets of the old partnership
were involved. "The Kittredge case might apply to the instant suit if there had
been a showing here that in every reorganization of the partnership . . . the
decedent's interest in the old partnership was clearly his separate property, and
the reorganization involved merely a transformation of interests from the old
legal entity to the new one, without the acquisition of additional property or the
expenditure of community funds." Id. at 357. However, the court continued, indicating that any undivided profits or surplus involved in the reorganization would
be community property, thus making the interest in the new partnership one
acquired partly with community funds. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
Ordinary commingling rules would then make the new interest community property. See notes 196-206 infra, and accompanying text. An affirmation of Hollier
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133

zation causes a spouse to receive shares issued in lieu of separ-

ately owned stock, the new stock will likewise be separate property.

119

Courts have been vigilant to prevent transformation of other
community assets into stock from defeating rights acquired
under marital community law. 120 Where a husband exchanged
community immovables for their fair value equivalent in stock,
it was held that the wife had no claim to the immovables, as
she was protected by recognition of her ownership of one-half
the stock. 12 1 Where the husband's action is in fraud of her
rights, she would have the additional protection of article 2404,
an action against her husband's heirs and perhaps against the
transferee. 22 The wife's community rights prevail over corporate stock restrictions in close corporations.12 3 On the other
hand, community property law will not be allowed to shield
profits from improper stock transactions against the operation
1 24
of prohibitive laws.
Cash dividends, either from separately owned or community
owned stock, clearly enter the matrimonial community. 125 Undoubtedly a stock split 121 or stock dividend 27 on community
owned stock would likewise accrue to the community. Where
separately owned stock has been split, and a greater number of
would seem to indicate a great contraction of the Kittredge rule.
119. Fleming v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Succession of
-lemenway, 228 La. 572, 83 So. 2d 377 (1955).
.120. See Oliphint v. Oliphint, 219 La. 781, 54 So. 2d 18 (1951).
121. Succession of Geagan, 212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118 (1948).
122. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870).
123. Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So. 2d 169 (1956); see
Oliphint v. Oliphint, 219 La. 781, 54 So. 2d 18 (1951); Wainer v. Wainer, 210
La. 324, 26 So. 2d 829 (1946).
124. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. Walet, 104 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. La. .1952)
(Securities and Exchange Act pre-empted inconsistent state community property
law). Compare Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
125. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2334, 2386, 2402 (1870) ; cf. 0hanna v. Ohanna,
129 So. 2d 249 (la.
App. Orl. Cir. 1.961) ; Beals v. Fontenot, 29 F. Supp. 602
(E.D. LA,. 1939). Prior to the 1944 amendment of article 2386, the classification of dividends from separately owned stock of the wife would depend on which
spouse was administering the propertly. Compare Slater v. Culpepper, 233 La.
1071, 1083-85, 99 So. 2d 348, 361 (1957).
126. "Stock split" in this Comment is used in the sense of corporate action
dividing each share into two or more, without capitalization of earned surplus.
See GRAIIAM & KATZ, ACCOUNTING IN LAW PRACTICE § 81. (1938) ; KATZ, INTRO'
DUCTION TO ACCOUNTING § 110 (1954).
127. "Stock dividend" in this Comment is used in the sense of corporate actiondistributing surplus in the form of additional shares, in proportion to ownership
of original shares. The result is to move the surplus funds to capital. See
GRA HAM & KATZ, ACCOUNTING IN LAW PRAC'ICE § 80 (1938); KATZ, INTRODUCTION TO ACCOUNTING § 110 (1954).
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new shares issued in place of the old, it has been decided that
all of the new shares are separate property of the spouse who
owned the stock. 12 But, what is the result in relation to separately owned stock when, instead of making a cash distribution
from surplus, the corporation capitalizes the surplus and issues
it in the form of stock dividends? In the leading case of Daigre
v. Daigre,1' the husband owned twenty shares of stock at the
time of marriage. During the marriage the corporation declared stock dividends of 680 shares. In separation proceedings
the wife claimed that the dividend shares were community
property. In holding that the dividend shares fell into the separate estate of the husband, the court disposed of arguments based
30
on all the general classification provisions of the Civil Code.1
It was reasoned that the interest of the husband in the corporation remained exactly the same after the distributions as before:
that the same assets were represented in the original shares
plus their proportionate interest in the surplus account as in
the additional number of shares which the husband now pos.sessed."'. Since nothing in effect had been placed into the patrimony of the husband which he had not already owned, neither
article 2334 nor article 2402 was applicable. Though article
2386 relates to fruits of the paraphernal property of the wife,
the court also considered it, and determined that its reference
to "dividends" applied to ordinary cash distributions, not to dis13 2
tribution of surplus in form of stock dividends.
Daigre is clearly in line with most decisions, 133 including income tax cases which have held stock dividends not taxable as
income ;134 yet general theories of community property, as well
128. Succession of Hemenway, 228 La. 572, 83 So. 2d 377 (1955).
129. 228 La. 682, 83 So. 2d 900 (1955), followed, Succession of Hemenway,
228 La. 572, 83 So. 2d 377 (1955).
130. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2334, 2386, 2402 (1870).
131. Cf. Succession of Quintero, 209 La. 279, 24 So. 2d 589 (1946).
132. This is the usual interpretation of the unmodified word "dividend." See,
e.g., Powell v. Maryland Trust Co., 125 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1942). However,
several cases have ruled that "dividends" was broad enough to include stock dividends. See, e.g., Adams Elec. Co. v. Graves, 272 N.Y. 77, 4 N.E.2d 941 (1936) ;
Empire State Dairy Co. v. Sohmer, 218 N.Y. 199, 112' N.E. 755 (1916) ; Rose v.
Barclay, 191 Pa. 594, 43 Atl. 385 (1894).
133. See, e.g., Duncan v. United States, 247 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Scofield v. Weiss, 131 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Blaine v. Blaine, 63 Ariz. 100,
159 P.2d 876 (1945) (law provides profits of separate property remain as separate property) ; Tirado v. Tirado, 357 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) ; John-son v. First Nat'l Bank, 306 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
134. The leading case is Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). For purposes of taxation, distinctions have been drawn between a stock dividend which
works no change in the corporate structure, as in Daigre, the same interest in
the corporation being represented after the distribution by more shares of the
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as peculiarities of stock dividends, may dictate a reconsideration. One basic principle of the Louisiana marital community
is that it enjoys a right akin to usufruct over the separate property of the spouses. 135 Through this principle the community.is
guaranteed sufficient capital to fulfill its purpose - providing
an economic base for the family. 13 6 Thus it is at least arguable
that a stock dividend, distributed in lieu of a cash dividend, could
be conceived as the equivalent of cash and treated as a fruit
which ought to inure to the community. From an accounting
standpoint, though the corporate structure is not affected by the
normal stock dividend, the net result is the same as if the stockholders had been paid a cash dividend and all recipients had

immediately reinvested the cash in additional shares of the same
corporation. 137 From general principles of community property
law, it is evident that, had this transaction actually occurred,
the new stock would belong to the community. Should such totally different consequences flow from two methods of accomplishing the identical object? 18 It seems not. Additionally, the
stock dividend method may effectively postpone the time when
the corporation will be able to pay cash dividends, through reduction of its surplus account. 39 If one spouse owns a controlling interest in a corporation, this effect would allow that spouse
much freedom in determining his contribution to the community
fund. 140 This objection may not be serious since the spouse could
same character, and a stock dividend which involves changes of corporate identity
or a change in the nature of the shares issued, whereby the interest of the shareholder in the corporation is basically affected. See SCHAPIRO & WIENSHIENK,
LAW AND ACCOUNTING 173, n.19 (1949).
Further investigation of this distinction is beyond the scope of this Comment. It is, however, to be expected that
the problem would be slight in Louisiana, since a corporation is prohibited from
paying stock dividends in shares of another class than that owned by the recipient,
unless specific provision for such payment is made in the articles of incorporation or is authorized by the vote of the majority of the shares of the class in
which the payment is to be made. LA. R.S. 12:26(F) (3) (1950).
135. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REv. 204 (1964).
136. Ibid.
137. PATON, ACCOUNTANT'S HANDBOOK 1016 (3d ed. 1950).

138. The court in Daigre does consider this objection: "At this point it might
also be well to consider the difference between a stock dividend and a cash dividend which the shareholder uses to buy stock in the same corporation. The difference between these two transactions is easy to grasp. In the stock dividend
transaction the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation assets
remains unchanged. On the other hand, if a shareholder receives a cash dividend
with which he buys additional shares of the same type of stock in the same corporation, the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation assets is
increased." 228 La. at 691, n.1, 83 So. 2d at 903. Of course, this assumes that
all the shareholders receiving the cash dividend will not act similarly, all reinvest-ing in the corporation.
139. See Note, 30 TUL. L. Rav. 589, 590 (1956).
140. But see Note, 15 TUL. L. REV. 308, 309 (1941),. where the author con-
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always sell the separate stock, and reinvest in other separate
property.' 4 ' Further, Daigre largely ignores the practical effect
of declaration of a stock dividend: nearly always such a declaration by a corporation causes the marketability of the stock to
be increased which, in turn, causes the market value, albeit not
the book value, of the stock to rise, at least temporarily. 142 An
astute shareholder-spouse is thus presented the opportunity to
sell part of the stock dividend (equal in value to, or less than,
the total increase in the value of his holdings due to the market
rise) thus converting it into separate cash, while retaining the
same total amount of assets in his separate estate. The funds,
though probably small in amount, would completely by-pass the
community - a result probably not contemplated by the law.
Some protection from blatant misuse of this last device is, however, afforded by the fact that any such sale would also result
in reduction of the spouse's interest in the corporate ownership.143 It is submitted that Louisiana courts might profitably
reconsider the Daigre rule in search of a rule more appropriate
to the community property system.
Since Daigre is based in large part on federal tax cases recognizing that as a general rule stock dividends are not taxable
income, 4 4 it appears likely that when the stock dividend is one
the federal courts would recognize as taxable, such as shares of
cludes the majority of French commentators hold the community cannot complain
of a normal amount of reinvestment activity, thus they would tend to treat stock
dividends on separate stock as separate property. However, he further indicates
that Colin et Capitant argue that, when a firm or corporation retains part of
its earnings as a reserve, or reinvests them in the corporation or firm, thus increasing the value of the spouse's interest or stock, to deny the community the
gain would be to deprive it of something to which it is entitled under the provisions of th French Civil Code.
141. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1874).
However, if the property were sold
and the proceeds reinvested in other separate property, the fruits therefrom would
generally be available in the community fund.
142. GRAHAM & KATZ, ACCOUNTING IN LAW PRACTICE § 79 (1938); see
PATON, ACCOUNTANT'S HANDBOOK 1016 (3d ed. 1950) ; Note, 30 TUL. L. REV.
589, n.11 (1956).
143. Heavy reliance by Daigre on Scofield v. Weiss, 131 F.2d 631 (5th Cir.
1942) shows the court may have been more worried about another possibility:
"[W]e think it clear that under the settled jurisprudence of Texas, separate
ownership of stock in a corporation may not be converted in part into community ownership by the device of declaring stock dividends. If this were so, a
wife owning stock in a successful and prospering corporation might find the protection of her separate ownership taken away overnight and her property subjected to the claims of her husband's community creditors at any time that the
directors decided to declare stock dividends. Nor is it any answer to say that
the directors can do this by declaring cash dividends, for the two are not the
same." Id. at 632.
144. See note 134 supra.
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a different character in the same corporation'4 5 or shares of
would hold these
another corporation, 14 1' the Louisiana court
147
community.
the
into
fall
shares
dividend
One additional problem faced by courts in relation to separately owned corporate stock is the classification of increases in
value during the marriage. It is clear that appreciation in the
value of stock would not in any case affect the ownership of the
stock, but the appreciation may give rise to a potential claim
for reimbursement through an accounting adjustment.148 The
Louisiana Civil Code allocates such increases in value of separate property to the community only if the increase was due to
"common labor, expenses or industry.' 1 49 Increase in the value
of stock is difficult to fit into this concept, and in two cases'5°
the court has dismissed the possibility of its application. However, these holdings appear dubious when the stock is the husband's stock in a close corporation in which he also serves as a
key employee, since the increase in value realistically is attributable at least in part to the husband's labor and industry.
Under the general rules of community property applied to property other than stock, such increases would clearly give rise to
a reimbursement claim. 15 ' That the husband, as a key employee,
receives a generous salary which inures to the community,
should be totally irrelevant in determining whether reimburse152
ment is due for increases in value of separately owned stock.
PENSIONS

The problem of pensions in community property law is surprisingly not a new one, though today it has assumed new importance as the sources and frequency of pension funds multi54
proply.- ' An early Spanish code, the Nueva Recopilaci6n,1
145. Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936).
146. Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U.S. 347 (1918).
147. See Note, 30 TUL. L. REV. 589, 592 (1956).
148. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2408 (1870).
149. Ibid.
150. See Beals v. Fontenot, 29 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. la. 1939).
151. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2408 (1870); Daigre v. l)aigre, 228 La. 682, 83
So.2d 900 (1955).
152. But see Beals v. Fontenot, 29 F. Supp. 602, 604 (E.D. La. 1939) : "The
increase in value of the stock was due to the efforts of the corporation and there
Beals [husband] was fully
is no reason here to disregard the corporate fiction ....
paid for his individual efforts." Compare note 140 supra.
153. See Johnson, Retirement Benefits as Community Property in Divorce
15 BAYLOR L. REV. 284 (1963).
Oases,
154: NUEVA RECOPILACI6N bk. 5, tit. 9, L. 2 (1567).
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posed a solution for governmental pensions. Since the sovereign
could make gratuitous donations, just as any other individual,
the donation would be separate property if made to one spouse
individually, or community property if made to both. However,
if the donation was related to service of the sovereign, the status
of the fund donated would depend on whether the service was
rendered with or without pay. It was reasoned that if the donee
served without pay his support came from the community during the period of service, and the donation was intended to replace the community funds spent for support. On the other
hand, if the pensioner received pay for his services, presumably
it covered expenses of support, and the pension would be his
separate property. 155
The Spanish rule was once recognized in Louisiana ;15 however, its statutory basis was not carried into the Louisiana Civil
Code, and as a practical matter the situation visualized- governmental service without pay - is unlikely to arise in modern
society. Further, the Spanish rule was based on the theory that
under some circumstances the governmental donation was gratuitous. This concept of pensions has been abandoned in America in favor of a theory more compatible with constitutional government: that a government pension is based on a moral obligation. 15 7 Thus an analogy of government pensions to donations
seems inappropriate.
In contrast, pensions from private sources may be either a
gratuity 5" or an enforceable right which has accrued as a mat155. MATIENZA, COMMENTARIA (1597), transl. in ROBBINS, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAWS 76 (1940). Whether the gift was considered made to the community

or to one of the spouses individually, it was clear that the normal community
property rule caused the fruits from the pension or gift to fall into the community. Ibid.
156. Hughey v. Barrow, 4 La. Ann. 248 (1849) (donation made during period
when laws of Spain in force).
157. See United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 441 (1896): "Payments
to individuals, not of right, or of a merely legal claim, but payment in the nature
of a gratuity, yet having some feature of moral obligation to support them, have
been made by the government . . . ever since its foundation." Accord, Succession
of Scott, 231 La. 382, 91 So. 2d 574 (1956) ; contra, United States v. Brown, 110
F. Supp. 370 (S.D. Calif. 1952).
158. Since many private pensions are granted by corporations, it seems arguable that these pensions ought to be classified as onerous transactions in order
not to be ultra vires. See 6A FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CoRPoR.ATIoNs § 2939 (1950) : "It seems to be the rule that a private corporation has no power voluntarily to pay to a former officer or employee a sum of

money for past services, which it is under no legal duty to pay, and which would
not constitute a legal consideration for a promise to pay." Carrying this principle to its logical conclusion would have great effect on private pensions, since
it would mean that all private pensions validly granted by corporations would
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ter of contract, express or implied. Courts consider whether the
pensioner has a legal right to the pension, or whether such a
right will accrue in the future, and, if neither, tend to classify
the pension as a donation. 159 In any event, this will prove largely a question of fact. Classification as a donation requires a
decision whether the pension was granted to one spouse or to
both: if the former, it is separate property, if the latter, property of the community. 1

Enforceable private pension rights and government pensions
generally seem subject to the same rules. The general rule is
well established that the time when the service was rendered for
which the pension is granted determines the status of the pension funds. This rule is consonant with the principle of classification originally embodied in the Louisiana Civil Code, 161 and
has given little trouble when the services were wholly rendered
either prior to or during marriage. In the former case the pension will be separate property of the pensioner, 162 and in the
latter property of the community.' 6 The actual time of payment of the funds would be irrelevant in determining their
status; thus if the services were rendered wholly prior to marriage, the fact payment was made during marriage would not
prevent the pension from being separate property.'6
More troublesome problems arise if the services for which
the pension is granted have been rendered partly during and
partly outside a marriage relationship. Where the services begin prior to marriage, continue into the marriage, and the
pension becomes payable while the marriage still exists, it seems
the presumption favoring classification of acquisitions during
fall into the community, if the work which justified the pension was done during the existence of the community. However, no cases have been found which
attempted to apply the principle and it may be dismissed. See Daigre v. Daigre,
228 La. 682, &3 So. 2d 900 (1955).
159. See, e.g., Daigre v. Daigre, 228 La. 682, 700-02, 83 So. 2d 900, 906-07
(1955) (on rehearing).
160. LA. CivIL CODE art. 2334 (1870).
161. Id. art. 2402.
162. Succession of Lewis, 192 La. 734, 740, 18) So. 118, 120 (1939) ; Howard
v. Ingle, 180 So. 248 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
163. Cullen v. Spremo, 142 Cal. App. 2d 225, 298 P.2d 579 (1956) ; Succession of Scott, 231 La. 382, 91 So. 2d 574 (1956) ; Brand v. Brand, 120 S.W.2d 310
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (salary bonus during marriage community property);
Reedy v. Jones, 41 S.W.2d 1044 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ; contra, United States v.
Brown, 110 F. Supp. 370 (S.D. Calif. 1952).
164. Price v. Price, 217 Cal. App. 2d 221, 31 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1963) ; In re
Ney's Estate, 212 Cal. App. 2d 891, 28 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1962); Succession of
Lewis, 192 La. 734, 189 So. 118 (1939) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 23 S.W. 1022
(Tex. Civ. App. 1893).
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marriage as community property would by itself cause these
funds to be classified as community property. 16 5 It appears desirable, however, to allow the named pensioner to preserve as
separate property the percentage of the pension representing
the time for which services were rendered prior to marriage.'6 6
Even if the fund was partly composed of actual deductions
from wages, such proration would not deprive the community
of its fair share.
Yet more difficulties arise when the marriage is dissolved
by divorce or separation prior to the accrual of the pension
right, part of the services supporting the eventual right to a
pension having been rendered during the marital community.
If it is certain that the pensioner will ultimately receive some
benefit from the fund, without the necessity of continued services in order to qualify for a benefit, courts have generally
taken the position that the pension right is subject to immediate
division, just as other property of the community. 16 7 The nonpensioner spouse will generally be satisfied for his share of
the pension by taking an extra share of the present property
of the community, ""' to reimburse his share of the community
for any deductions made from the pensioner's salary. 6 9 Should
this method of division be inconvenient, the court would be justified in rendering a money judgment against the pensioner for
the other spouse's share of future payments.1 7 0 It appears irrelevant whether the pension fund actually has a present cash
value, if it will necessarily become payable in the future, even
though the date at which it will have value is uncertain. 17' On
the other hand, if the eventual right to the pension is conditioned on the pensioner continuing to serve in a certain occupation, it appears supportable to deny the non-pensioner any interest in the fund, by accounting between the spouses or otherwise. 172 The rationale of the rule allowing adjustment between
spouses when the fund is certain to accrue is that the pension
105. Cf. Abunza v. Oliver, 230 La. 445, 88 So. 2d 815 (1956).
166, Cf. Berg v. Berg, 115 S.W.2d 1171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
167. Benson v. Los Angeles, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257, 384 P.2d 649 (1963); Williamson v. Williamson, 203 Cal. App. 2d 8, 21 Cal. Rpptr. 164 (1962) ; Crossau
v. Crossau, 35 Cal. App. 2d 39, 94 P.2d 609 (1939) ; Baselt v. Baselt, 37 Wash.
2d 461, 224 P.2d 631 (1950).
168. See note 167 supra.
169. Cf. Succession of Rockvoan, 141, So. 2d 438 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
Kirkham v. Kirkham, 335 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
170. See
Messersmith v. Mlessersmnith, 229 La. 495, 510, 86 So. 2d 169, 174 (1956).
'171.

172. Cf. Williamson v. Williamson, 203 Cal. App. 2d 8, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164
(1962).
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will.reimburse the pensioner for deductions from his share of
the community. When applied to the contingent pension funds,
however, the same rule would have the undesirable effect of im-posing a restraint on an individual's right to change his occupa-

tion at will. He would, in effect, be subjected to a form of involuntary servitude in order to prevent depletion of his patrimony. Even under the contingent pension funds, it seems just
to allow the non-pensioner spouse adjustment in the amount of
one-half of any community funds contributed to the plan, provided the potential pensioner could terminate his employment
prior to accrual of pension rights, and demand his contributions

from the fund.
Where the pension is either from a fund of the federal government or from funds contributed by employers and employees
and held by the federal government"13 additional factors may
174
enter into the determination of classification of the proceeds.
In other contexts, Free v. Bland 75 rules that where federal law
designates a certain person as the payee of a fund, under the
supremacy clause of the Constitution, the federal law will supersede any inconsistent state property scheme. Free seems to lead
to the result that state courts not only cannot render a valid
judgment changing in part the payee of the pension the funds
for which are held by the federal government, or requiring the
payee to give over a part of whatever he receives from the fund,
but also they are precluded from taking the funds into account
173. Compare the Civil Service Retirement Act. ch. 195, § 11, 41 Stat. 619
(1920), with the Railroad Retirement Act of 1935, ch. 812, § 14, 49 Stat. 973
(1935).
174. The uncertainty involved is illustrated by the trial court judgment in the
case later reported as Kirkham v. Kirkham, 335 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. ApI).
1960). The judgment, as quoted in Johnson, Retirement Benefits as Community
Property in Divorce Cases, 15 BAYLOR L. REV. 284 (1963), follows: "The retired Pay Account of Defendant, is hereby divided 30% to Plaintiff and 70% to
Defendant as to said Account and all future payments and benefits therefrom.
A certified copy of this Decree shall be filed with the ... Finance Center, U.S.
Army . .. , and shall authorize such Federal Agency to divide said pay account
in the proportions herein set out as fully and completely as if said Defendant
had made a lawful allotment of said account in favor of Plaintiff as provided in
the
regulations relating thereto and as provided in this Decree.
. "If
Federal Statute or regulation prevent the direct payment to Plaintiff of
her share in such retired pay account as and when payments are made, then, in
that event, the Plaintiff is hereby awarded a sum of money equal to thirty per
cent (30%) of the gross monthly retired service pay of Defendant at such times
and when monthly payments are received by him from said retired pay account
as a money judgment against Defendant, and for her recovery of which execution
may issue in case of nonpayment; or, enforcement of this award and judgment
may be had in any manner provided by law -for the collection of Plaintiff's share
of said retired pay account and all payments and benefits accruing thereunder."
175. 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
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in adjusting the shares in the community of the separated
spouses. 1 76 However, the uncertain extent of Free's present application may justify a state court in making whatever adjustment it deems necessary, short of changing the payee of the
fund. 177 It appears that the interest of the federal government
in having its obligees defined and not subject to change would
prevent state courts from taking the latter step. 178
The general classification of insurance proceeds is elsewhere
considered, 79 but one case is particularly relevant to the present discussion. In Easterling v. Succession of Lamkin8' the decedent had taken out disability insurance while still unmarried.
Then he married, suffered disability, and subsequently died.
Under well-established jurisprudence, a life insurance policy
taken out in the same manner would be the separate property
of the insured.18 1 However, the court distinguished life insurance from disability insurance on the ground that the latter had
no value until the insured became disabled, and that disability
payments were intended to be in lieu of wages.

82

Since wages

earned at the time of disability and thereafter would have been
community property, the disability benefits were treated likewise. Though the court's distinction of life and disability insurance may be questionable,183 the result of Easterling appears
176. Compare Allen v. Allen, 363 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962). Here,
at time of divorce, husband was receiving a pension under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1935, ch. 812, § 14, 49 Stat. 973 (1935). The fund under the Act
was held by the Treasury of the United States, and was composed of contributions from the employer and the employee. Apparently the husband's contributions had come from his salary during the marriage, a sum which is normally
community property. The court decided the wife has no future interest in the
fund, on the ground of congressional intent that only the named pensioner was
to have an interest in the fund. However, the court did indicate the future payments could be taken into consideration in dividing the estate. This latter suggestion may now be precluded by Free. See notes 38-50 supra, and accompanying
text. See also Perryman v. Tonkin, 283 P.2d 298 (Cal. App. 1955), which involved the Civil Service Retirement Act, ch. 195, § 11, 41 Stat. 619 (1920). The
court found the federal law did not indicate any certain person who was to take
the fund. In light of such a finding, it would seem the Free rule would be inapplicable.
177. See discussion of present extent of Free rule at notes 38-50 supra.
178. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
But see Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
. 179. See Cahn, Louisiana Civil Law as Applied to Life Insurance, 12 LA. L.
REv. 56 (1951).
180. 211 La. 1089, 31 So. 2d 220 (1947).
181. See, e.g., Succesison of Lewis, 192 La. 734, 189 So. 118 (1939).
182. Compare 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 68

(1943).
183. Easterling v. Succession of Lamkin, 211 La. 1089, 1103, 31 So. 2d 220,
225 (1947) (dissent) : "[T]he right to receive the disability benefits of a disability insurance policy is an incorporeal thing even before the disability of the

19641

COMMENTS

sound. At least part of the premiums were paid with community funds, and thus the situation seems analogous to the private
pension to which the pensioner has a contractual right. It is
submitted that the fact the insured intended the benefits to
stand in lieu of wages should be given weight by the courts.
One case, however, casts doubt on the above analysis of
Easterling by indicating that workmen's compensation benefits
payable to an injured wife do not fall into the community, as
would her wages for the same period. 8 4 One possible resolution
of the two cases lies in consideration of the analogy between
workmen's compensation benefits and the separate nature of
the wife's claims to damages for personal injury. 185 Instead
the court based the decision on the peculiar nature of the act
under which recovery was sought. The rationale is surprising
since the court recognized that one purpose of the workmen's
compensation statute is to provide subsistence when earning
capacity is diminished- a purpose indistinguishable from that
of disability insurance. Whether the court would reach the
same result if a husband claimed workmen's compensation
benefits as his separate property appears doubtful. 186 It seems
better for the court to recognize that compensation benefits
should be treated in the same way as wages: if wages paid at
the same time as the compensation benefit in question fall into
the community, the benefit should likewise be community prop87
erty.1
On the other hand, if the compensation benefits in question
are death benefits,18 it appears that the beneficiary would take
the payments as his or her separate property. 8 9 Obviously,
the right to the payments does not accrue until the death of the
workman, and the same event which gives rise to the right to
90
benefits also dissolves the community.
insured." See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term
- Donations, 8 LA. L. REV. 206, 210 (1948). McKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY

§ 490 (2d ed. 1925) indicates that where the disability policy is taken out prior
to marriage, such as in Easterling, courts would have difficulty distinguishing
the policy from the life insurance rule.

184. Brownsfield v. Southern Amusement Co., 198 So. 670 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1940), dismissed on rehearing, 198 La. 74, 198 So. 656 (1940).
185. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 186 (1964).
186. See Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 28 TUL. L. REV.
3, 44 (1959), where it is properly stated such would be a startling conclusion.
187. See 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 68 (1943).
188. LA. R.S. 23:1231 (1950).
189. See McKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 491 (2d ed. 1925).
190. It should be noted that the suggested result is analogous to the result in
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COMMINGLING OF COMMUNITY AND SEPARATE PROPERTY

Failure of the spouses to discriminate carefully between
their separate property and community property in the funds

utilized for the purchase of additional property, in the composition of bank accounts, or in the operation of separate or
community businesses gives rise to myriad problems of classification,1 91 which may be conveniently grouped under the term
"commingling."

In general, commingling may be defined as a
blending of movables, belonging to separate owners, so that
192
the parts belonging to each cannot be distinguished.
The strong presumption favoring the community is fully
operative in commingling problems, 193 and places the burden of
proving that separate property is involved in any transaction
on the person asserting the separate nature of the disputed
property. 9 4 Even if it is shown that separate property is involved, the theory of commingling may still dictate that the
the areas of health and accident insurance, see notes 180-183 supra, and accompanying text; classification of the character of proceeds of life insurance policies
payable to a named beneficiary other than the insured's estate, see Comment, 17
LA. L. REV. 810 (1957); and the likely result in classification of recovery by
claimants under a wrongful death action (not a survivorship action, which may
present other problems), see LA. CIVIL CODE 2315 (1870), as amended.
191. See 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 61 (1943):
"This presumption of the Spanish law that the property which the husband and
wife had should be presumed common necessarily arose in the case of intermingled properties, and such intermingled properties were considered community
properties where they were so mixed that it could not be known to which of them
they belonged and neither could prove his or her right of ownership ....
In our
own community property states this intermingling of the properties of the spouses
and the intermingling of community with separate property may result in the
whole being considered community property, the mode of handling having been
such as to render it impossible to distinguish which is which. It is obligatory
upon the husband as the one having the management of the community property,
to keep the community and separate property segregated, and he must assume
the consequences for failure to do so."
The problem may be even more acute in other community property states than
in Louisiana. In addition to problems of mixed titles, discussed at note 198 infra,
most of the other states, unlike Louisiana, recognize the fruits of separate property as separate property. On the other hand, all the community property states
recognize the "toil and talent" of the spouses as community property. This raises
grave problems when one or both of the spouses add their "toil or talent" to the
separate estate and produce fruits therefrom. How are these fruits to be classified? See MOKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 312 (2d ed. 1925).
192. See McKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 308 (2d ed. 1925).
193. E.g., Coney v. Coney, 220 La. 473, 56 So. 2d 841 (1951) ; Cameron v.
Rowland, 215 La. 177, 40 So. 2d 1 (1949) ; Succession of Manning, 107 La. 456,
31 So. 862 (1902).
See generally LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2334, 2386, 2402, 2405
(1870); 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 61 (1943)
McKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 323 (2d ed. 1925).
194. E.g., Coney v. Coney, 220 La. 473, 56 So. 2d 841 (1951) ; Cameron v.
Rowland, 215 La. 177, 40 So. 2d 1 (1949) (indicating testimony of wife not
enough) ; Succession of Manning, 107 La. 456, 31 So. 862 (1902).
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disputed property is community property. Exceptionally, commingling may not be operative if the amount of community
'property involved in any transaction is insignificant when compared with the separate property involved."'
Acquisitions and Other Transactions During Marriage
with Mingled Funds
The problem of commingling in relation to the acquisition
of property is largely one of proof. To establish that an acquisition during marriage is separate property, the husband or wife,
or those asserting rights under either, must prove that separate
funds were used to pay the purchase price. 196 At first Louisiana
courts seemingly required that no community funds be mingled
197
in the price paid, in order that separate ownership be shown.
This early termination of fund tracing has the advantage of
preventing mixed titles (ownership in both one spouse and the
community) by vesting ownership, in the community when any
community funds, except perhaps insignificant amounts, are
used to pay the price.1 98 It appears that the spouses would re195. See MoKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 308 (2d ed. 1925).
196. Succession of Schnitter, 220 La. 323, 56 So. 2d 563 (1951); Betz v.
Riviere, 211 La. 43, 29 So. 2d 465 (1947) ; Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148
So. 37 (1933) (dictum).
197. See Huie, Separate Claims to Reimbursement from Community Property
in Louisiana, 27 TuL. L. REv. 143 (1953). In Succession of Schnitter, 220 La.
323, 56 So. 2d 563 (1951), a deed in the wife's name recited a consideration of
$2800, of which it was proved that $2500 came from her separate estate. The
wife could not prove the source of the $300 balance, so the presumption in favor
of the community dictated a decision that this had been paid from community
funds. The result was that the property belonged to the community. Accord,
Betz v. Riviere, 211 La. 43, 29 So. 2d 465 (1947) ; Houghton v. Hall, 177 La.
237, 148 So. 37 (1933) (dictum). In Succession of Hollier, 158 So. 2d 351, 358
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), writs granted, 160 So. 2d 231, the court said: "The law
also is settled that when separate funds and community funds, even though distinguishable and not commingled, are used in making up the consideration paid
for property acquired during the existence of the community, the property so
purchased becomes community property, although the community may be indebted
to the separate estate for the amount of separate funds used in making of the
purchase." Cf. Succession of Land, 212 La. 103, 31 So. 2d 609 (1947), where
the court emphasized that the major part of the purchase price had been paid
with community funds.

198. See note 159 supra. See also Huie, Separate Ownership of Specific
Property Versus Restitution from Community Property in Louisiana, 26 TUL. L.
REv. 427, 428 (1952) : "In . . . most of the other American community property
states the ownership tracing principle has been widely extended. . . . Property
paid for in part with separate funds and in part with community funds is owned
by a mixed title, partly separate and partly community. ...
"Louisiana, on the other hand, adhering more closely to the civil law, ha
confined ownership tracing within relatively narrow limits. A claim for reimbursement or restitution from community assets, rather than a claim to ownership of specific property, is more likely to be the form in which the separate
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ceive adequate protection through recognition that there must
be a knowing use of community funds, 199 and when community
funds are thus used, the community would incur a liability to
the separate estate from whence came the balance of the
funds. 2 ° It follows that even if the purchase was clearly begun
with the use of separate funds, later use of community or
mingled funds to complete the payment of the price would pre20 1
vent a finding that the acquisition is separate property.
However, following an earlier indication of dissatisfaction
with the above principles, 20 2 the recent case of Graves v. United
States Rubber Co. 20 3 may cast serious doubts on their application, and may indicate that Louisiana courts are willing to
liberalize the standard of proof. There the wife maintained a
separate bank account, which came to contain large deposits
of both community and separate funds. She purchased immovable property for her separate estate, and the court apparently
accepted as proof that she had used separate funds to pay the
price the fact that the account had contained more than enough
separate funds to meet the price. 20 4 Though such an approach
estate of a spouse is preserved."
See also MCKAY, COMMJUNITY PROPERTY § 317 (2d ed. 1925).
199. See Bailey v. Alice C. Plantation, 152 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1963).
200. Succession of Hemenway, 228 La. 572, 83 So. 2d 377 (1955). The success of the reimbursement claim in preventing unjust enrichment will be considered in subsequent sections. See notes 225-246 infra, and accompanying text.
201. Magnolia Pet. Co. v. Crigler, 12 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942)
(dictum).
202. E.g., Betz v. Riviere, 211 La. 43, 29 So. 2d 465 (1947).
203. 237 La. 505, 111 So. 2d 752 (1959).
204. A similar result was reached in Giamanco v. Giamanco, 131 So. 2d 159
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1961), where the husband and wife maintained only one bank
account, that of the community. The amount on deposit therein belonging to the
community was small, and husband deposited over $60,000 of separate funds.
Thereafter he drew $34,500 from the account to pay the cost of improvements on
his separate estate. "[T]here is no way to show with absolute certainty . . . that
these funds were used to pay construction costs. However, when we take into
consideration that the total costs of construction were only $34,500, it is most
reasonable that at least this amount came from plaintiff's [husband] separate
money.
"The Court realizes full well, and the bank statements indicate, that there
was considerable commingling of the proceeds of the five sales listed above in
this bank account with other funds in substantial amounts, the source of which
is not explained in this record. It must be presumed that these other funds belonged to the community. However, despite this fact it is the opinion of the
Court that plaintiff has shown with reasonable certainty under the facts . . .
that at least $34,500 of the total of the $60,265 in proceeds from sales of the
plaintiff's separate property was used to construct the original restaurant building." Id. at 166.
Accord, Succession of Land, 212 La. 103, 31 So. 2d 609 (1947) ; Succession
of Blades, 127 So. 2d 263 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961). Compare Slater v. Culpepper, 129 So. 2d 449 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) (wife made donation from com-
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may give rise to great administrative difficulties not presented
by the prior arbitrary rule, it seems the new approach will be
accepted by Louisiana courts.2° It may be suggested that the
Graves approach will be utilized, and properly so, whenever
the court can be shown adequate records so that the amount
of separate and community funds can be ascertained with accuracy at all times. 20 6 The existence of such records will prevent
any unjust enrichment of either spouse at the termination of
the community.
It has been decided that where loans have been made from
commingled funds, the amounts repaid or due will be commu20
nity property,20 7 and in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Crigler 8
the same result followed, even though the loan was made from
separate funds, when the debt was novated and a new note
given therefor, representing both the debt to the separate estate
and debts due to the community. Graves may dictate a reappraisal of these holdings, with the result that if adequate
records are maintained to determine what part of the funds
belong to the community and what part to the separate estate
of one spouse, the separate ownership will not be destroyed.
Commingling in Bank Accounts
Understandably, commingling problems most frequently
arise out of bank accounts. Two situations are presented: where
purchases have been made from commingled accounts, governed
by the rules set forth in the preceding section, and where ownership of the commingled fund itself is in dispute. Only the latter
situation is here considered.
Of course, merely retaining a separate account during marriage, without making any deposits, will not of itself cause the
mingled bank account, thinking it separate; donation borne by separate estate).

205. See note 204 supra.
206. Compare Stephens v. Colfax Bank & Trust Co., 148 So. 456 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1933), where a wife had inherited and deposited in defendant bank a sum
of $110, thereafter depositing in the same account sums of community property
greater than the original deposit, and making withdrawals exceeding the amount
of her inheritance. The court said: "The separate property being mingled in
confusion with the community property, and the common fund having been
checked against by deceased in excess of the amount of the separate funds, plaintiffs have failed to discharge the burden" of proving the balance of the account
is separate. Id. at 457.
207. See Abraham v. Abraham, 230 La. 78, 87 So. 2d 735 (1956) ; Magnolia
Pet. Co. v. Crigler, 12 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
208. 12 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
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fund to become that of the community.2 "9 On the other hand, if
the account is that of the wife and she fails to file the declaration required by article 2386,210 the addition of any interest to
the account will pose the commingling problem, since the interest would be the property of the community. 211 Similar results
would follow if interest is added to the husband's separate account, as he is given no such advantage as that of the wife
under article 2386.212
As a general proposition, it may be said that indiscriminate
mingling of separate and community funds will cause the bank
account to be classified as community property.213 In addition
to those deposits which are clearly property of the community,
deposits which are not identified as separate property will be
treated as community property in deciding whether there has
been a mingling of funds. 21 4 The courts will consider whether
the amount of community funds allegedly mingled with separate funds is relatively great when compared with the sum
of separate funds involved. Thus, in the leading case of Succession of Land,215 where the separate funds of the wife in the
account totaled over $250,000 and the community funds consisted of several salary payments deposited in the same account, the court summarily ruled that the insignificant percentage of community funds would not warrant designation of
the account as property of the community.2 16 But, in accord
209. Abraham v. Abraham, 230 La. 78, 87 So. 2d 735 (1956); cf. Richer v.
Richer, 179 La. 1, 153 So. 1 (1934).
210. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2386 (1870), as amended.

211. Compare Slater v. Culpepper, 233 La. 1071, 99 So. 2d 348 (1957) (on
rehearing), with Abraham v. Abraham, 230 La. 78, 87 So. 2d 735 (1956).
212. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2402 (1870).
213. See, e.g., Slater v. Culpepper, 233 La. 1071, 99 So. 2d 348 (1957) (on
rehearing); Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So. 2d 169 (1956);
Bruyninckx v. Woodward, 217 La. 736, 47 So. 2d 478 (1950) ; Smith v. Brock,
200 So. 342 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940). But see Graves v. United States Rubber
Co., 237 La. 505, 111 So. 2d 752 (1959).
214. Cameron v. Rowland, 215 La. 177, 40 So. 2d 1 (1949) (testimony of
wife alone will not prove separate nature of deposit) ; Smith v. Brock, 200 So.
342 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940). See also Slater v. Culpepper, 233 La. 1071, 99
So. 2d 348 (1957) (on rehearing) ; Abraham v. Abraham, 230 La. 78, 87 So. 2d
735 (1956) ; Bruyninckx f. Woodward, 217 La. 736, 47 So. 2d 478 (1950).
215. 212 La. 103, 31 So. 2d 609 (1947).
216. See Odom v. Odom, 121 So. 2d 8, 10 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960) : "The law
contemplates that when separate funds are mixed with community funds, they
only become a part of the community when such separate funds are no longer
capable of identification. When only a relatively small amount of the deposit is
community it will be considered inconsequential and insufficient to constitute
commingling and does not warrant the designation of the checking account as
community property." Accord, Succession of Hollier, 158 So. 2d 351 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1964) ; Succession of Blades, 127 So. 2d 263 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) ;
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With Graves, even though the mingling be considerable, if the
person asserting the separate nature of the account can trace
the funds to his separate estate, the court will generally apportion the account. 217 The standard of proof is high, and a mere
inference from the fact the spouse had separate funds at the
beginning of the community will not be sufficient to overcome
21 8
the presumption favoring the community.
Even though the account in which the separate funds are
deposited be clearly classified as a community account, in con-.
trast with the facts of Succession of Land, it seems that the
separate nature of the funds would not be destroyed, especially
if adequate records are maintained to allow tracing of the
funds or indication is made of the separate nature of the funds
at the time of deposit.2 1 Thus in Talbert v. Talbert220 transferral of funds from a separate account into a community account, and shortly thereafter withdrawing a sum identical to
the deposit to pay a separate debt, was not a use of community
funds.
It seems sound to allow mingling even of great amounts
without destruction of the separate nature of bank accounts,
if the funds in the account remain traceable. On the other hand,
where the parties have made it impossible to separate the
sources of the funds, albeit ,the community deposits are relatively small, there can be litle quarrel in classification of the
account as community property. However, the courts should
remain vigilant to prevent one spouse from consciously destroying the other's separate ownership. of an account by fraudulently
depositing community funds therein.22' To help the court procontra, Succession of Hemenway, 228 La. 572, 83 So. 2d 377 (1955) (distinguishable on facts). In. Slater v. Culpepper, 233 La. 1071, 99 So. 2d 348 (1.957) (on
rehearing), a community deposit of $1300 in relation to separate funds of $66,800
was insufficient to characterize the entire fund as community. See also MCKAY,
COMMUN ITY PROPERTY § 308 (2d ed. 1925).

217. Graves v. United States Rubber Co., 237 L a. 505, 111 So. 2d 752 (1959)
Slater v. Culpepper, 233 La. 1071, 99 So. 2d 348 (1.957) (on rehearing); Abraham v. Abraham, 230 La. 78, 87 So. 2d 735 (1956) ; Odom v. Odom, 121 So. 2d
8 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960).
218. Charlton v. Bailey, 12 So. 2d 646 (l.a. App. 1st Cir. 1943).
219. Cf. Slater v. Culpepper, 233 La. 1071, 99 So. 2d 348 (1957) (on rehearing) ; Talbert v. Talbert, 199 La. 882, 7 So. 2d 173 (1942).
220. 199 La. 882, 7 So. 2d 173 (1942).
221. Cf. Bailey v. Alice C. Plantation, 152 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1963) ; see McKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 309 (2d ed. 1925) : "[W]here the
husband takes the wife's separate funds, deposits them with the funds of the
community, till there has come to he a complete confusion so far as the deposit
is considered, is there not a strong equity in favor of compensation to the wife
separately or her heirs for the wife's funds handled by the husband in this way?"
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tect the rights of both spouses, tracing should be allowed beyond
the mingled account, as in Graves, solely on the basis of whether
adequate records are maintained.
Destruction of Separate Ownership by Commingling
Other Than in Bank Accounts
One of the more surprising effects of the community property system is that separate ownership of movables other than
money may be destroyed by indiscriminate commingling. This
result is most easily observed when a spouse owns a separate
business (and inventory) at the time of marriage, or acquires
one as his separate property during marriage. During the
operation of the business, the inventory will change in composition, until most or all of the inventory will have been acquired
during the marriage with community funds. On such facts, it
has been decided that the entire stock will belong to the community, except items proved to be parts of the original inventory, and hence, not acquired with community funds. 22 2 The
separate estate is presumably protected by a claim for reim2
bursement at the termination of the community. 2
On the other hand, since immovables are not consumed in
222. Labat v. Labat, 232 La. 627, 95 So. 2d 129 (1957) ; Menhert v. Dietrich,

36 La. Ann. 390 (1884) ; Werner v. Kelly, 9 La. Ann. 60 (1854). See Vining
v. Beatty, 161 So. 2d 298, 301 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964) : "While the burden of
proof was upon plaintiff to establish . . . the paraphernal character of the property seized, it is conceivable that some portion of the stock of merchandise originally purchased may have remained on hand until the time of the seizure. If
such were true, the property has not been identified or pointed out. Whatever
merchandise remained, if any, became mingled with and unidentifiable from merchandise subsequently obtained and which, having been acquired from the profits
of the business, became community property ...
"The original separate property, having become commingled with property
acquired by the fruits or earnings of such separate property, which is analogous
to the mixing or commingling of the separate funds of one of the spouses with
funds constituting a community asset, must be termed community property. In
view of the presumption in favor of the community, the burden of proving the
separate derivation of any property lies with the spouse asserting the same. ...
No proof having been offered as to the identity of the separate property, if any,
such property has lost its identity and may now be considered community property."
But see Succession of Solis, 119 So. 768 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929), where the
court was faced with facts similar to Vining, except that the separate merchandise had belonged to the husband. Apparently on evidence that the value of the
merchandise now held was equal to that originally owned separately, the court
held that the stock was still separate property. Compare Joly v. Weber, 35 La.
Ann. 806 (1883).
223. See Labat v. Labat, 232 La. 627, 95 So. 2d 129 (1957) ; Werner v. Kelly,
9 La. Ann. 60 (1854). See also Huie, Separate Ownership of Specific Property
Versus Restitution From Community Property in Louisiana, 26 TUL. L. REv.
425, 435-37 (1952).
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use, they should remain the separate property of the original
owner :224 there is no possibility that the thing will be so confused with community property that it cannot be identified and
specifically restored to the owner at the termination of the community.
22

Reimbursement

Obviously, under some of the circumstances set forth above,
the husband or wife will frequently be unable to prove separate ownership of a particular item. In general, when separate funds or property are lost because of commingling, the
spouse who is deprived of ownership will have a claim for reimbursement.2 26 However, as a practical matter, the ultimate
chances of success may depend largely on which spouse is
making the claim.
Wife's Claims
In compensation for property lost by commingling, the wife
has an unqualified right of restitution from the funds of the
community. 227 This fact clearly shows that reimbursement is
the corollary of tracing of funds to prove ownership: where
the latter is cut off, the former begins.
Of course, the wife must first show that she in fact once
had separate funds, 228 but this alone will not entitle her to
reimbursement.229 The wife must show that the funds were
either delivered to the husband, or expended for the benefit of
the community.23 0 It has been suggested that liberal standards
224. Menhert v. Dietrich, 36 La. Ann. 390 (1884).

225. Full treatment of the complex subject of reimbursement is beyond the
scope of this Comment. For a very thorough development of this subject, see
Huie, Separate Claims to Reimbursement from Community Property in Louisi-

ana, 27 TUL. L. Rav. 143 (1953). The theories set forth by Huie are reflected
in the present section of this Comment.
226. See Succession of

Hemenway,

228 La. 572,

592, 83

So. 2d

377, 384

(1955) : "[I]t is well to observe that whenever separate funds have been used
in the acquisition, of an asset which, by operation of law, has the status of community property, the community is indebted to and must reimburse the separate

estate to the extent that it has been benefited." See generally Note, 33 TL. L.
REv. 244, 246 (1958).
See also McKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 322 (2d ed.
1925).
227. See La. Civil Code art. 2391 (1870) ; Slater v. Culpepper, 233 La. 1071,
99 So. 2d 348 (1957) (on rehearing) ; Joly v. Weber, 35 La. Ann. 806 (1883).
Restitution of paraphernal effects is made from the community and not from the
husband's one-half thereof. Slater v. Culpepper, supra.

228. Succession of Manning, 107 La. 456, 31 So. 862 (1902) ; cf. Cameron v.
Rowland, 215 La. 177, 40 So. 2d 1 (1949).
229. See note 228 supra.

230. E.g., Succession of Schnitter, 220 La. 323, 56 So. 2d 563 (1951) ; Sue-
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of, proof should be observed when commingling relegates the
wife to a reimbursement claim. 23 1 This suggestion seems a
worthy one, for the wife does not have the broad powers of
control and management over the community property vested
in the husband, and she may not be in position to effectively
23 2
prevent commingling from taking place.
Husband's Claims
Contrary to the claims of the wife, the husband's claim may
233
be exercised only after the termination of the community.
Prior to dissolution of the marital community, the husband's
property or funds which have fallen into the community must
be considered as an irrevocable contribution of capital to the
community estate.
As a starting point, the husband must show that he once
had a separate estate .23 4 Yet mere proof of this fact, and evidence that the husband no longer owns all or a part of the separate estate once owned, will not establish the claim for reimbursement from the community.23
It has been repeatedly
affirmed that no law guarantees the integrity of the separate
estate of the spouse at the date of dissolution of the community. 236 Perhaps this is a reflection that, as head and master
cession of McMahon,. 176 La. 63, 145 So. 269 (1932) ; Jones v. Jones, 130 La.
438, 58 So. 140 (1912).
231. See Huie, Separate Claims to Reimbursement From Community Property
in Louisiana, 27 TrL. L. REv. 143, 175 (1953).
232. The extent to which courts have gone to trace funds of the wife and
give reimbursement is illustrated by Fletcher v. I-lodges, 145 La. 927, 931-32, 83
So. 194, 195-96 (1919): "[T]he evidence shows that plaintiff inherited a mule
and a mare; that her husband traded the mare for two mules and $50; and that
one of the mules was sold to . . . Gore for $125; that the other of these mules
was traded to . . .Tarver for a horse and $75, for which sum ... Tarver gave
his note; and that this horse was afterwards sold to ... Tarver; and that plaintiff has received nothing from these transactions.
"The evidence does not show whether the ... Tarver $75 note was ever paid;
nor what use the $125 and $50 were put to. Under these circumstances, we can
give plaintiff judgment only for the $175, and only against the community."
233. See, e.g., Carter v. Third Dist. Homestead Ass'n, 195 La. 555, 197 So.
230 (1940) ; Falconer v. Falconer, 167 La. 595, 120 So. 19 (1929) ; Sharp V.
Zeller, 110 La. 61, 34 So. 129 (1902) ; Smith v. Reddick, 42 La. Ann. 1055, 8 So.
59 (1890).
234. Succession of Roque, 176 La. 711, 146 So. 477 (1933).
235. Succession of Ferguson, 146 La. 1010, 84 So. 338 (1920) ; Succession
of Bollinger, 30 La. Ann. .193 (1878) ; Belair v. Dominguez, 26 La. Ann. 605
(1874) ; Babin v. Nolan. 6 Rob. 508 (La. 1844).
236. E.g., Abunza v. Oliver, 230 La. 445, 88 So. 2d 815 (1.956) ; Succession
of Geagan, 212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118 (1947) ; Succession of Ferguson, 146 La.
1010, 84 So. 338 (1920) ; Ohanna v. Ohanna, 129 So. 2d 249 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1961)..,
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of the community, the husband is in a position to meet a greater
burden of proof; at least, he has the power to keep his property
and that of the community apart, or to keep sufficient records
to trace his separate property.237 Thus, the husband has to
prove that the expenditure of his separate funds benefited the
community estate, 238 and further, some cases have indicated
that he may have to prove that the community still was receiving the benefit of the contribution at the date of its dissolu23 9

tion.

Although many just claims were probably lost, a relatively
high standard of proof remained workable, perhaps avoiding
fraudulent practices, 240 until the decision in Succession of Provost. 241 In that case the court unfortunately equated the standard of proof necessary for the husband to establish his claim
237. See Succession of Ferguson, 146 La. 1010, 1043, 84 So. 338, 349 (1920)
(dictum): "The husband, being master of the community and also master of
his own estate, may invest the funds of either at his pleasure. If he thereby
acquires property, it is presumed to belong to the community; but, if he makes
a loss, there is no presumption that he lost the funds of the community. So that,
if, at a given time, a married man has $50,000 of funds his separate property,
and $50,000 of community funds, and he thereafter dies, leaving property worth
only $50,000, and acquired during the existence of the community, the whole of
it is presumed to have been acquired with the funds of, and to belong to, the
community, and the mere inference, however reasonable it might appear, that
he had invested and lost the funds of the community and his separate funds
in equal proportions, would be inadmissible. His heirs would be obliged to rebut
the presumption, established by law, that all the effects so left, belonged to the
community, and prove, affirmatively, not that the decedent had had separate
funds, and that they were no longer to be found, but that he had invested them
in the particular property found in his succession."
See also 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 61 (1943).

238. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So. 2d 12 (1956) ; Abunza v.
Oliver, 230 La. 445, 88 So. 2d 815 (1956); Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229
La. 495, 86 So. 2d 169 (1956) ; Succession of Roque, 176 La. 711, 146 So. 477
(1933) ; Vicknair v. Terracina, 168 La. 417, 122 So. 276 (1929) ; Succession of
Cormier, 52 La. Ann. 876, 27 So. 293 (1900) ; Succession of Breaux, 38 La.
Ann. 728 (1886).
239. Succession of Bell, 194 La. 274, 193 So. 645 (1940); Munchow v.
Munchow, 136 La. 754, 67 So. 819 (1915) ; Ohanna v. Ohanna, 129 So. 2d
249 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1962) ; cf. Succession of Provost, 190 La. 30, 181 So.
802 (1938) ; Succession of Ferguson, 146 La. 1010, 84 So. 338 (1920).
However, in many cases the court has allowed a reimbursement claim without
apparent inquiry into whether the property was still on hand at the dissolution
of the community. See cases cited in Huie, Separate Claims to Reimbursement
from Community Property in Louisiana, 27 TUL. L. REV. 143, 157, n.70 (1953).
240. See Buie, Separate Claims to Reimbursement from Community Property
in Louisiana, 27 TuL. L. REv. 143 (1953). See also Vicknair v. Terracina, 168
La. 417, 419, 122 So. 276, 277 (1929), where, quoting from the trial court, it
was said: "[lit is to be remembered that it is encumbent upon the husband to
be most circumspect and accurate in proof of claims against the community.
He is the head and master thereof. In a very real sense, both the wife and her
financial interests are at his mercy..... To accept his own unsatisfactorily
supported assertions would be to place wives at an unfair disadvantage." (Emphasis added.)
241. 190 La. 30, 181 So. 802 (1938).
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for reimbursement with the proof necessary to negative a find242

ing of commingling of community and separate property.
Since reimbursement had been considered a remedy when there

was in fact commingling, it is a startling proposition that the
existence of the disease itself prevents application of the cure.
It was arguable that Provost was modified the next year following its rendition,248 but later decisions have reaffirmed the
244
Provost ruling.
There is reason to believe that Provost will not be rigidly

applied when the husband both owes a debt to the community
and claims a reimbursement from the community. In Abunza. v.

Oliver,245 a husband had deposited separate funds in a commingled bank account, having previously withdrawn a larger

amount to pay separate debts. The court allowed a set-off between the two debts, while at the same time affirming Provost.

This may be an indication of dissatisfaction with the rule of
the latter case.
The doctrine of commingling is a salutory one, preventing
242. Id. at 50, 181 So. at 809: "The plaintiffs have not averred any specific
use of these separate funds for the benefit of the community, but have depended
upon the general proposition that the funds were commingled with community
funds, and thereby the community became the beneficiary. The very fact that
the petition alleges that the funds were commingled with the funds of the community and were used for its benefit, negatives the proposition that there was
any specific use of the separate funds for any provable advantage of the community, and for this reason, the trial judge considered the fact pleaded of a
specific amount as belonging to the separate estate as admitted.
"The trial judge held that some of the claims which the plaintiffs contend
belonged to the separate estate fell properly within the community. If such be
not the case, plaintiffs cannot recover these claims, because of the commingling
of the separate funds so claimed with the funds of the community, first, for the
reason that, although plaintiffs have shown the collection of these funds by the
husband, they have failed to show that they were actually used for the benefit
of the community; secondly, for the reason that, had plaintiffs shown that the
commingled funds were actually used for the benefit of the community, they
could not recover, because of the impossibility of proof by plaintiffs, as to which
part of the funds belonged to the community, and as to which part of the funds
belonged to the separate estate of the decedent." Id. at 52, 181 So. at 809.
Compare Succession of Cormier, 52 La. Ann. 876, 27 So. 293 (1900) which
is distinguishable from "rovost on the ground that specific use of the funds was
proved.
243. Succession of Bell, 194 La. 274, 193 So. 645 (1940).
244. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 233, 91 So. 2d 12, 22 (1956): "[Wje
conclude that, when the proceeds of these policies . . . were received by defendant [husband], they were his separate property. However, these funds were
deposited in the community bank account and an inspection of this account
reveals that they were commingled with community monies to such an extent
that it would be practically impossible to deduce that the separate funds, when
spent, had been used to enhance the community." Accord, Abunza v. Oliver,
230 La. 445, 88 So. 2d 815 (1956).
245. 230 La. 445, 83 So. 2d 815 (1956).
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many difficult administrative problems for Louisiana courts.

However, if it is to remain acceptable, its corollary, the reimbursement claim, must not be abrogated. It is submitted that
the admittedly broad powers of the husband to manage the
community property should not be taken to impose upon him
a higher standard to prove a reimbursement claim than that
240
required from the wife.
Commingling of Livestock
A series of cases have developed peculiar rules of restitution,
when the commingled property consists of livestock. Under the
section of the Civil Code relative to usufruct there are par-

ticular rules concerning the obligation of a usufructuary to
restore cattle at the termination of the usufruct. 247 Further,
article 2372248 provides in relation to the wife's dowry, that
when it consists of "herds or flocks" the husband has to deliver
the whole number of cattle he originally received. Largely influenced by these provisions, the courts have in the livestock
cases clearly committed themselves to holding that the community is a sort of usufructuary. 49 Thus where one of the spouses
brings a number of cattle into the marriage, at its dissolution
that person is entitled to take from the common herd the same
number of cattle which he or she brought into the marriage
even though none of the original cattle remain.2 50 It is obvious
from the cases that the standard of proof required for reimbursement of livestock brought into marriage is less than that
246. See generally Succession of Bell, 194 La. 274, 193 So. 645 (1940);
Succession of Cormier, 52 La. Ann. 876, 27 So. 293

(1900)

(from syllabus by

court) ("No fixed rule or standard as to the extent or sufficiency of evidence
necessary to establish a claim of that character can be formulated. Each case
must rest on its own peculiar state of facts.") ; Succession of Kidd, 51 La. Ann.
1157, 26 So. 74 (1889).
247. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 592, 593 (1870).
248. Id. art. 2372.
249. See Huie, Separate Ownership of Specific Property Versus Restitution
from Community Property in Louisiana, 26 TUL. L. REv. 425, 435 (1952): "In
determining the rights and obligations between spouses and the community the
courts have evidently felt free to use only those rules of the law of usufructs
that they deem suitable, but they have recognized the analogy to a usufruct
and have at times found in the law of usufructs the solution- to community property problems. . . . Undoubtedly the analogy to a usufruct can be given controlling effect whenever the law of usufructs furnishes a desirable solution to the
particular problem, but since the courts have sometimes applied the usufruct rules
and sometimes not, the extent to which those rules are controlling can be determined only by a detailed study of each problem."
250. Talbert v. Talbert, 199 La. 882, 7 So. 2d 173 (1942); Succession of
Andrus, 131 La. 940, 60 So. 623 (1913); Succession of Waterer, 25 La. Ann.
210 (1873) ; Wimbish v. Gray, 10 Rob. 46 (La. 1845). Compare McKAY,
COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 311 (2d ed. 1925).
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in situations where reimbursement is handled by

251
credits against the community fund.

SEPARATE AND JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS

The importance of separate and joint bank accounts in a
community property system is obvious from the previous discussion of commingling. Very early, most states judicially recognized the right of the wife to deal with bank accounts in her
own name,25 2 and even prior to the general emancipation acts, 253
Louisiana legislatively recognized a married woman's right to
2 51
open a separate bank account, as if she were unmarried.
Shortly thereafter, statutory provisions were added to govern
joint deposits and give protection to the bank who honored a
survivorship provision in the deposit arrangement. 255 There
was nothing to prevent the two depositors from being members
of a conjugal union.
It is clear that merely depositing community funds in a
separate account does not affect the nature of the funds,256 any
251. See, e.g., Talbert v. Talbert, 199 La. 882, 7 So. 2d 173 (1942). The
husband testified that he owned approximately 250 head of cattle at the date of
marriage and his testimony was corroborated by that of other witnesses. This
was held sufficient to allow him to take a like number from the community at
its dissolution. In Succession of Andrus, 131 La. 940, 60 So. 2d 623 (1913),
it was recognized that all the spouse could show was that he or she had once
owned a certain number of cattle, which were devoted to the use of the community. This was sufficient. In Wimbish v. Gray, 10 Rob. 46 (La. 1845), the
court (in syllabus) said: "[W]here the community is dissolved by the death
of the husband, and the cattle brought by the wife into the marriage, are shown
to have increased, she will be entitled to claim as her separate property a
number equal to that brought by her into the marriage. Nor is it necessary that
she should identify any of the cattle as those which belonged to her at the time
of the marriage. If the whole herd do not die, the husband is bound to make
good the number of the dead out of the new born cattle." Query: would not the
new-born cattle belong to the community, as "fruits"?
252. See MOKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 745 (2d ed. 1925).

253. LA. R.S. 9:101-105 (1950), originally enacted as La. Acts 1916, No. 94,

§ 1.

254. La. Acts 1896, No. 63, § 1, now appearing as LA. R.S. 6:28 (1950)
"A married woman may open accounts in the different national or state banks
of Louisiana, and deposit money, checks, notes, and other funds therein, and may
withdraw the same by check or otherwise and without the assistance or intervention of her husband in the same manner and under the same conditions as if
she was (sic) a femme sole or unmarried woman."
255. La. Acts 1908, No. 188, § 1, now appearing as LA. R.S. 6:32 (Supp.
1963).
256. Howard v. United States, 40 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. La. 1941); DeMaupassant v. Clayton, 214 La. 812, 38 So. 2d 791 (1949)); Cameron v. Rowland,
215 La. 177, 40 So. 2d 1 (1949) ; Drewett v. Carnahan, 183 So. 103 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1938) ; cf. Succession of Ipser, 180 La. 656, 157 So. 380 (1934) ; Marlatt v. Citizens' State Bank & Trust Co., 180 La. 387, 156 So. 426 (1934);
Levert v. lebert, 51 La. Ann. 222, 25 So. 118 (1899) ; Succession of Tanner,
24 So. 2d 642 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946) (dissenting opipnion) ; Demasi v. Whitney
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more than merely depositing separate funds in a community
account destroys their separate nature. 257 However, even though
depositing community funds in a separate account of the wife
does not affect the community's ownership, it may effectively
withdraw them from the control of the husband. 258 The court
reasoned that since married women were given the authority
by the legislature to draw checks upon and withdraw from
accounts in their own names, the bank must remain free from
conflicting claims of the husband. Otherwise, the bank would
be forced to investigate the source of all deposits made by married women- a burden which would certainly operate to deprive married woman of the benefit of the legislation. Under
these peculiar facts, the husband is totally without remedy,
since he cannot sue the bank, nor can he sue the wife without
seeking dissolution of the marriage.2 5 9 Similarly, when community funds are deposited in the name of the wife alone, they
cannot be seized by community creditors in an action to which
2 °
the wife has not been named a party. 6
Joint bank accounts between spouses have been equally
troublesome. Usually, the deposit arrangements provide that
the funds are payable to either party or to the survivor. The
withdrawal and survivorship provisions are valid insofar as
the bank is concerned, and it is protected in paying the deposit
to either named depositor or to the survivor. 26 1 One joint deTrust & Say. Bank, 176 So. 703 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937) (wife deposited community funds in bank account under fictitious name). See McKAY, COMMUNITY
PROPERTY § 745 (2d ed. 1925).
257. See text accompanying notes 222-226 supra.
258. LaCaze v. City Bank & Trust Co., 31 So. 2d 891 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1947).
259. LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1963); see LaCaze v. City Bank & Trust Co.,
31 So. 2d 891 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947) ; cf. DeMaupassant v. Clayton, 214 La.
812, 38 So. 2d 791 (1949).
260. Smith v. McCall, 14 La. Ann. 609, 122 So. 149 (1929).
261. LA. R.S. 6:32 (Supp. 1963) : "A. When a deposit is made in any bank
. . . under the name of two or more persons, payable to each of such joint
depositors, this deposit or any part of it, or any interest or dividend on it, may
be paid to any such joint depositor, whether the other joint depositor or depositors be living or not, and the receipt or acquittance of the person paid is a full
release and discharge of the bank . . . for any payment made ...
[I]f one of such joint depositors seeks to prevent payment to an"B ....
other . . . , the party seeking so to do must give notice in writing, signed by him
and delivered to the . . . bank. ...
"C. After the receipt of such notice from one or more of such
joint depositors,
the bank may refuse to honor any check, draft, or demand upon the said deposit
or by any of the joint depositors, including the one or ones requesting, as aforesaid, the stopping of payment, unless all of the joint depositors upon the said
account join in drawing such draft or check or demand for payment or other
withdrawal of any of the funds.
"D. In the event any bank shall have received a notice in writing required
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positor may give notice to the bank not to pay out to another
joint depositor, and in this event the bank is protected in dishonoring checks and prohibiting withdrawals from the account. 262 However, it appears that even after the notice, the
bank could pay to one joint depositor, and still be free from
liability. 263 The parties would then have to adjust their rights
between themselves- an action which, in relation to married
joint depositors, is barred during the marriage. 264 The present

law in relation to joint deposits between married persons is
probably contrary to the case of Le Rosen v. North Central
Texas Oil Co., 2 0 which turned on a finding that when a deposit
was made to the joint account of husband and wife, the deposi266
tary had an obligation to account to both of them.
in Sub-section B hereof, such bank shall be relieved of responsibility to each
and every one of the joint depositors upon the account or deposit in question for
failure or refusal to honor any check or draft or demand for payment or withdrawal unless the action is taken by all of the parties in whose names the account
or deposit stands."
Similar statutes have been enacted in relation to institutions other than
banks. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 6:751 (1950) (building and loan associations); id.
6:663-664 (credit unions). See also id. 6:751.1 (Supp. 1964) ; id. 9:1513
(Supp. 1964).
262. See note 261 supra.
263. See note 261 supra.
264. LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1963).
Northcott v. Livingood, 10 So. 2d 401, 405 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943) : "[T]his
act simply vests in the depositary bank a discretion in cases falling within its
terms; such bank 'may' pay the deposit to the survivor or survivors or not as it
sees fit. If it does make payment to the survivor or survivors no recourse thereafter may be had upon the bank for having done so. This does not mean that by
such a payment the right of ownership in whole or part to the deposit of the
heirs of a deceased or recourse against the one to whom payment is made are to
any extent abridged or affected. It simply means that when the bank makes
such a payment to the survivor or survivors it is fully protected for having done
so, and thereafter all right to the amount thus paid are relegated to future action,
if any, among the legal owners or claimants thereof."
Succession of Tanner, 24 So. 2d 642, 648 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946) (dissent)
"[T]he bank owing the amount of the deposit on the death of either joint depositor could have paid the deposit to the survivor, and so far as the bank was
concerned, it would have been relieved of further liability, regardless of the fact
that the fund would have remained a community asset. . . . For the purpose
of paying the deposit to the survivor the bank would have been fully discharged
from further liability. . . . But the payment of the amount of the deposit to
the survivor would not affect the ownership of the money so paid."
265. 169 La. 973, 126 So. 442 (1930).
266. In LeRosen the husband had leased community lands for mineral exploration, under an "unless" lease which provided for payment of delay rentals
to be made to the account of the husband. The lessee made the payments, but
deposited them in the joint account of husband and wife. In an action brought
by the husband to cancel the lease for nonpayment of delay rentals, the lessee
contended that the rental was community property, and that deposit in the joint
account placed the funds under the control of the husband as much as if they
have been deposited in a separate account. Both the court of appeal and the
Supreme Court failed to agree with the lessee, on the ground the depositary was
obligated to account to the wife for the funds. "Under the law a married woman
is authorized to deposit money or other funds in bank and to withdraw the same
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COMMENTS

Even under the current law, it would seem that deposits in
a joint account of a married couple would be presumed to be
community property. 267 Thus separate creditors of the wife
cannot rely on the fact that funds have been deposited in such
a joint account, and their claims may be defeated by a showing
that the funds represent community property, which cannot be
268
seized for her debts.
It is settled that joint deposits with survivorship provisions
do not affect the requirements for a valid donation, either inter
269
vivos or mortis causa.
Kenneth D. McCoy, Jr.

NATURE OF THE WIFE'S INTEREST DURING THE
EXISTENCE OF THE COMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION

Characterization of the exact nature of the wife's interest
during the existence of the community has proved to be an
arduous task. In Arnett v. Reade, Justice Holmes stated: "It
is not necessary to go very deeply into the precise nature of
the wife's interest during the marriage. The discussion has fed
the flame of juridical controversy for many years."' In numerous attempts to settle the matter, jurists have described the
wife's interest as residuary, inchoate, dormant, as a hope or
expectancy, and as absolute ownership of one-half of the comwithout the authorization of her husband...

The bank, under the terms of

the deposit, was obligated to account for the fund to plaintiff's wife as well as
to plaintiff." Id. at 975-76, 126 So. at 443. Accord, Clingman v. Devonian Oil
Co., 188 La. 310, 177 So. 59 (1957).
LeRosen has subsequently been overruled on another point, Jones v. Southern
Natural Gas Co., 213 La. 1051, 36 So. 2d 34 (1948), but would appear to stand
on the question of payment to joint accounts. It is significant, however, that
the provisions discussed in the text at notes 261-263 supra were enacted subsequent to LeRosen and seem to negate the assumption in LeRosen that the depositary is obligated to account to all of the joint depositors. See Note, 12
Tur. L. REV. 465, 466 (1938).
LeRosen and Clingman are severely criticized in Daggett, Policy Questions
on Marital Property Law in Louisiana, 14 LA. L. REV. 528, 534 (1954).
267. Lagle v. Marchand's Estate, 129 So. 2d 349 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
268. Geo. L. Ducros Tile Co. v. Ruth, 137 So. 2d 484 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962).
269. Vercher v. Roy, 171 La. 524, 131 So. 658 (1930) ; of. Succession of
Mulqueeny, 156 So. 2d 317 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 157 So. 2d
234.
1. 220 U.S. 311, 319 (1911).

